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The history of scholarship on negation tracks and illuminates the major developments
in the history of metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, from
Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle through Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein to contemporary
formal theorists. Our perspective focuses on the catalytic role played by the 20th century
philosopher of language Paul Grice, whose views on negation serve as a fulcrum for
his attempt to bridge the (neo-)Traditionalist and Formalist traditions in logical thought.
Grice’s remarks on negation and speaker meaning and the elaboration of his ideas by
subsequent neo-Griceans are summarized and situated within a broader picture of the
role of contradictory and contrary negation in the frameworks of Aristotelians, Medievals,
early modern schoolmaster-logicians, 19th and early 20th century neo-Idealists and
Formalists, Oxford ordinary-language analytics, practitioners of classical and non-classical
logics, and a range of other philosophers and linguists. Particular attention is paid to the
relations between negation and the other operators of propositional and predicate calculus.
Implications for accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language are also
pursued and extensive references to related work are provided.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
“I wyl not deny my Greecian ofspring.”
Stanyhhurst, Æneis II. (Arb.), 1583, p. 46.
1. Introduction: Grice as a catalyst
The American Heritage Dictionary’s entry for Grice identiﬁes as a ‘British logician’, which for the purposes of this con-
tribution is what he was. (The entry goes on to acknowledge that he is “best known for his studies of the pragmatics of
communication and his theory of conversational maxims”.) We shall take Grice as a catalyst, since he represents a break-
through in a rivalry between two groups of philosophers in the history of logic. We hope to demonstrate that he was more
of a logician than the history of logic typically recognizes.
In choosing Grice as a catalyst and foundation stone, we open with a discussion of Formalism (or Modernism). This we
present as giving a “System” for the logic of negation – notably with a syntactic and a semantic component. In the second
part, we brieﬂy discuss Neo-Traditionalism (or Informalism) which Grice saw as presenting a challenge to Formalism. We
propose, with Grice, that most of the observations made by the Informalists pertain to the pragmatic component of the
System, and characterize pragmatic rather than logical inference.
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and the treatment of one of its central concepts. We center on the ideas of Grice as an example of a logical treatment
of negation, but also as a memorial to a speciﬁc chapter in logical historiography. Our focus will be one particular logical
feature of negation as it has been conceived in the history of logic as a ‘unary’ truth-functor. We shall now formulate the
Modernist-Neotraditionalist debate.
We take as starting point Grice’s opening passage in his epoch-making ‘Logic and Conversation’ (the second William
James lecture), where negation is ﬁrst cited:
It is a commonplace of philosophical logic that there are, or appear to be, divergences in meaning between, on the one
hand, at least some of what I shall call the formal devices – ∼,&, v,⊃, (∀x), (∃x), (ιx) (when these are given a standard
two-valued interpretation) – and, on the other, what are taken to be their analogues or counterparts in natural language
– such expressions as ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, ‘all’, ‘some’ (or ‘at least one’), ‘the’. (Grice [32, p. 22])
A close reading of the passage will shed light on much of the time-honored debate in the history of logic. Note for example
that the contrast Grice makes is between a ‘formal device’ (“∼”) and its vulgar counterpart (“not”).
The underlying assumption – which Grice states in the second passage is shared by Modernism, Neo-Traditionalism, and
Grice’s own Post-Modernism alike – seems to be that there is a formal counterpart (in our case, “∼”, the squiggle) to a
vernacular expression (“not”). This assumption is notably not challenged by Grice’s Post-Modernism. He may be a skillful
heretic, but his heresy was still of the conservative kind, and he ‘can always be relied to upon to rally to the defense of an
‘under-dogma”’ [32, p. 297]. In this case, the ‘under-dogma’ is the doctrine concerning the identity between “∼” and “not”
(“Some logicians may at some time have wanted to claim that there are in fact no such divergences; but such claims, if
made at all, have been somewhat rashly made, and those suspected of making them have been subjected to some pretty
rough handling”).
What Grice then takes as a commonplace incorporates the idea that “∼” ‘formalizes’ “not”, or Latin non (for the Scholas-
tics), or Greek ου. Interestingly, English ‘not’ shows a complexity that seems absent in the simplicity of “∼”. Old English had
na, and Middle and Modern English ‘not’ incorporates Old English na plus the emphatic with (cf. Jespersen [58], Horn [47]).
English was not, however, the language of the schools, and observations by other scholars of the highest intelligence, such
as Ælfric, are hardly credited in the history of logic. “Sume [propositions] syndan abnegativa, thaet synd, withsacendlice, mid
tham we withsacath”, as in “Ic ne dyde”).
As for the squiggle (“∼”), the contention behind its use seems to be the old Pythagorean idea that negation parallels
subtraction, whence the minus sign (“∼” being a variant of “-”). The correspondence between “∼” and “not” poses problems
of a categorical type. In grammar and scholastic logic, the received opinion seems to have switched from the idea that
‘not’ is an adverb (adverbium negandi [quod] denotat negationem, as Christopher Cooper has it in his Grammatica Linguae
Anglicanae (1685)) and a syncategorematon. A good compromise appears in Robert Bacon’s Sumule dialecticis with his talk of
“syncategorematon adverbialium”:
Non est adverbium quod prius et principaliter determinat ipsum, erit primum adverbium: tale autem est hec dictio non.
Per modum affectus signiﬁcatur per han dictionem non qualiter autem hoc sic intelligendum, videtur sic: cum anima
accipit duo incomplexa disconvenientia, ut hominem et asinum, aﬃcitur quadam dissensione, et huic dissensione, que est
intra, respondet hec dictio non in sermone extra. Unde illius dissensions que aﬃcit animam nota est hec dictio non.
In Modernist Logic, on the other hand, “∼” seems to be the only unary truth-functor worth discussing.
A further observation on Grice’s use of “∼” as a ‘formal device’: The idea seems to be not only that “∼” will do duty for
“not”, which is already a complex assumption. In a narrow interpretation, “∼” is a formal device if (and only if) it can be
expressed in the logical form of a natural language counterpart containing “not”. On this view, ‘formal’ would apply, strictly,
to a ‘formalized’ calculus. On a broad view, however, ‘formal device’ may refer more to logical ‘form’ understood as an
abstraction which may be the result of ‘formalization’. (“Not” is still a ‘formal device’ in, say, Winston Churchill’s speeches,
even if they never get ‘formalized’ into ﬁrst-order predicate logic.)
As it happens, while Grice goes on to invoke the debate between the rival groups of the Modernists and the Neo-
Traditionalists, he is mainly interested in the latter (as represented by Strawson) and their caveats on ‘reading’ “∼” as ‘not’.
For one thing, Strawson had urged a more faithful reading of “∼” as “it is not the case that . . .”, reﬂecting the sentence-initial
external maximal scope position that the sentential operator “∼” necessarily takes in propositional logic (“The identiﬁcation
of “∼” with ‘it is not the case’ is to be preferred to its identiﬁcation with ‘not’ simpliciter” [96, p. 79]). Grice ignores this
and translates “∼” merely as “not”. (As a note of interest, Grice does list both ‘some’ and ‘at least one’ as the ‘translations’
of ‘Ex’ in the above-quoted passage. But also note that while “at least one” and “some” do not include each other, “not” is
incorporated in the longer “it is not the case”.)
In any case, Grice found the commonplace to be wrong, and resulting from a blurring (committed by Modernists and
Neo-Traditionalists alike) of logical and pragmatic inference. (Here we rely on Grice’s unpublished lectures on Negation; cf.
Chapman [13, p. 87].)
Grice refers to Modernism and Neo-Traditionalism as “two rival groups . . . which I shall call the formalist and the in-
formalist groups” [32, p. 22]. Grice alludes to “the Modernists, spearheaded by Russell” [32, p. 372], and it is an interesting
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ernism. In any case, it seems obvious that Grice was parochially interested in the effect that tenets of Modernism had
received in the rather conservative atmosphere of the Oxford of his time, especially as the target of attack by Strawson.
(Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory had been welcomed by ordinary-language logicians (e.g. Warnock and Urmson) as
providing a more faithful characterization of the ‘logical behaviour’ of certain English expressions.)
Indeed, while Grice qualiﬁes a position such as Strawson’s as ‘Neo-Traditionalist’ (and not just ‘Traditionalist’) the same
could hold for ‘Modernism’. What Russell spearheaded was indeed a Neo-Modernism historically, if we recall that it was
authors like Ockham in Oxford who had fought for a logica moderna to oppose to the traditionalist logica vetusta of his
predecessors. But Ockham was perhaps not modern enough. The venerable inceptor whetting his razor (preﬁguring Grice’s
Modiﬁed Ockham’ Razor here in the form of a dictum “Do not multiply senses of ‘not’ beyond necessity”) had consid-
ered whether a proposition featuring ‘non’ (a terminus syncategorematicus) was atomic or molecular, and concluded that
the negation of a categorical proposition was still categorical. Thus, in a passage apparently ﬂouting his own razor, he
distinguished between propositional negation and term negation. The distinction, he thought, surfaced in cases of ‘priva-
tion’ (Aristotle’s ονωμα αριστον): “Every S is non P” was rendered as “Every S is of a kind K that is naturally P, and no
S is P”.
A more neutral label for Modernism would be Classicism (as when we speak of ﬁrst-order predicate logic as ‘classi-
cal’ [30, p. 67]). The issue arises as to what really is “(Neo-) Traditionalist” about Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory.
It cannot be Aristotelianism, when Strawson [95, p. 344] is eager to grant that neither Modernist (‘Russellian’) nor ‘Aris-
totelian’ logic faithfully represents the logic of ordinary language, which “has no exact logic”. Rather, it seems that Aristotle
was rather a pre- or proto-Gricean (see Horn [44] on “Greek Grice”). The central source is De Interpretatione, which di-
vides indicative-mode declarative sentences into assertion and denial (negation, απο´ασις, from αποανειν ‘deny, say
no’), which respectively aﬃrm or deny something about something [17a25]. As Grice observes, this division of indicative-
mode sentences into aﬃrmative and negative “may suggest that the notion of the exhibition of a subject-predicate form
enters into the deﬁnition of the very concept of a [indicative-mode] declarative sentence or proposition” ([31, p. 178];
cf. Cat. 11b17).
And what are we to do with an author such as Cook Wilson [102], situated somewhat between the Modernists and
the Neo-Traditionalists, who wonders if negation “is a different species” from aﬃrmation, “or whether the latter is in some
sense the form of all statements, and again whether the negative symbol belongs to the so-called copula”. Wilson’s tar-
get of attack is the ‘Modernist’ Mill, who listed judgments as being aﬃrmative or negative, “without troubling to ﬁnd the
genus of which they are species – the elementary fallacy of deﬁning by enumeration of species instead of a statement
of the genus”. Wilson’s own view is that ‘aﬃrmative’ and ‘negative’ “are not co-ordinate in the strict sense of the ter-
m” [102, p. 264] – the elementary fallacy of deﬁning a thing by what it is not. Symmetricalism is best represented by
Ralph Lever when attempting to replace the logician’s talk of ‘negation’ by ‘naysay’: “every simple shewasay is eyther a
yeaysay or a naysay” (Arte of Reason, [64]). (Cf. Horn [47, Chapter 1] for a comprehensive chronicle of the “(A)symmetricalist
Wars”.)
2. The background: Negation and opposition in Aristotelian logic
The genus of opposition (apophasis), as introduced in Aristotle’s Categories (11b17), is divided into four distinct species:
contrariety (between two contraries), e.g. good vs. bad, contradiction or αντ´ιασις (aﬃrmative to negative), e.g. He
sits vs. He does not sit, correlation (between two relatives), e.g. double vs. half, and privation (privative to positive), e.g.
blind vs. sighted. Aristotle proceeds to offer detailed diagnostics for distinguishing “the various senses in which the term
‘opposite’ is used” (11b16–14a25). Crucially, contradictory opposites (All pleasure is good, Some pleasure is not good) are mu-
tually exhaustive as well as mutually exclusive, while contrary opposites (All pleasure is good, No pleasure is good) do not
mutually exhaust their domain. Contraries cannot be simultaneously true, though they may be simultaneously false. Mem-
bers of a contradictory pair cannot be true OR false simultaneously; contradictories “divide the true and the false between
them”. So too, contradictory terms (black/non-black, odd/even, male/female) exclude any middle term, an entity satisfying the
range of the two opposed terms but falling under neither of them, a shirt which is neither black nor not-black, an integer
which is neither odd nor even. Contrary terms, by deﬁnition, admit a middle: my shirt may be neither black nor white (but
gray), my friend neither happy nor sad (but just blaah). (See Horn [52] for an overview of contradictory opposition and its
relatives.)
Privatives and positives always apply to the same subject and are deﬁned in terms of the presence or absence of a
default property for that subject:
We say that which is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or pos-
session in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time in which, it should be naturally present. We
do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or
sight at the time when by nature it should.
(Categories 12a28-33)
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privation is taken to be a subcase of contrariety.
One more species of opposition is worth mentioning. Aristotle’s early commentators Apuleius and Boethius, in struc-
turing the Aristotelian system in the form of a Square of Opposition (see Parsons [76]), deﬁne an additional relation of
subcontraries, so called because they are located under the contraries in the geometry of the Square:
As the contradictories of the two contraries, the subcontraries (e.g. Some pleasure is good, Some pleasure is not good) can
both be true, but cannot both be false. For Aristotle, this was therefore not a true opposition, since subcontraries are “merely
verbally opposed” (Prior Analytics 63b21-30).
The Aristotelian categories of opposition held sway through generations of logic handbooks. Here, for example, is Edward
Bentham [6, pp. 40–41]:
An universal aﬃrmative and an universal proposition are termed Contrary; They may be both false, but can not be both
true. A particular aﬃrmative and particular negative are termed Subcontrary; They may be both of them true, but cannot
in any instance be both of them false. An universal aﬃrmative, and particular negative, as also an universal negative and
particular aﬃrmative are termed Contradictory. They can in no instance be both of them true, nor both of them false.
The difference between contrary and contradictory propositions should be the more carefully observed, as it is common
enough to ﬁnd the two contending parties in a dispute to be both of them mistaken, while they maintain contrary
positions; which may be both of them false. So likewise as to subcontrary propositions. Men expressing themselves
indeﬁnitely sometimes grow angry with each other, supposing that their assertions are inconsistent; when if rightly
explained, they may be both of them found to be very true.
In this connection, Bentham provides Some faith does justify and Some faith does not justify as an example of what ought to be
non-ﬁghting words.
3. Modernists and Neo-Traditionalists in post-Gricean hindsight
It should be easier to catalog logicians as either Modernist or Neo-Traditionalists post-‘Logic and Conversation’. A few
instances show that this is not so easy. Thus, “ “∼’ “is pronounced ‘not’ ”. Hodges [39, p. 92] puts it: “Given any proposition
p, one can form from it another proposition which is its negation. In English this is usually done by inserting not in some
appropriate place in the sentence expressing it, though ambiguity is better avoided by tediously writing out It is not the case
that at the front of the sentence” (cf. Bostock [8, p. 17]). He goes on to pose the following exercise: ““Discuss that ∼ and
‘not’ mean the same” (Bostock [8, p. 20]). More emphasis comes from Cambridge: “By all means, read “∼” as “not”, but
remember that it shouldn’t be thought as a mere abbreviation of its ordinary-language reading. For a mere abbreviation
would inherit the ambiguity of the original, and then what would be the point of introducing “∼”? “∼” is best thought of
as a cleaned-up replacement for the vernacular not, which unambiguously expresses its original core meaning” (P. Smith,
Logic (2003) 59).
What Grice saw as the little war between Neo-Traditionalism and Modernism seems to be alive and well. Oxford has
now two different chairs for the two kinds of logic: the Wykeham chair of logic (New College, Faculty of Arts) and the chair
of “Mathematical Logic” (Merton, and The Mathematical Institute at St. Giles). Other universities have adopted other ways
of dissociating the two groups, in a latter-day version of C.P. Snow’s nightmare of the ‘two cultures’.
4. Modernism
It was said of Grice that he could always be relied upon to rally to the defense of an underdogma. Modernism was one
such underdogma in Oxford [32, p. 297]. Modernism claims that the logic of not worth preserving is that expressed by ‘∼’.
Any implicature should be seen as a ‘metaphysical excrescence’ [32, p. 23]. What we propose is to outline what Modernism
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class of valid inferences featuring negation.
It makes sense to start the discussion with Modernism not just because it is the ﬁrst of the rival groups that Grice
mentions. It shows that Strawson wasn’t really refuting Modernism by bringing attention to the divergence between the
formal device and the vulgar counterpart. (As Grice notes, that there is a divergence is a commonplace shared by both
Modernism and Neo-Traditionalism.) Second, in adding a pragmatic apparatus to the system in the form of conversational
implicature (as well as in proposing a bracketing device to provide a “conventional regimentation” of a pragmatic distinction,
a point to which we return below; cf. Grice [32, Chapters 4 and 17]), Grice is ultimately seeking a defense of Modernism.
Curiously, the strawperson here is not Strawson but Quine. Quine had sat in on the seminars on logical form given by
Grice and Strawson. Grice indeed presents his System Q as a tribute to Quine. What this System does is incorporate the
constraints that the formal device “∼” is supposed to have. Logic may have all started with Aristotle, but many argue that we
wouldn’t be studying it now if it were not for its ‘modern’ developments. The term ‘modern’, as applied to logic, is of course
regularly recycled – it was used to refer to the logic of William of Ockham, for example. In the more recent understanding, it
applies to classical two-valued systems as found in Whitehead/Russell’s Principia Mathematica; it is this approach that Grice
classiﬁes as ‘Modernism’ in his ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ [32, p. 372]. In the vademecum of classical logic, Whitehead and
Russell famously introduce the “∼” operator as the ‘contradictory function’, to be read as having always maximal sentential
scope, in the tradition of the Stoics and Frege. “The contradictory function with argument p, where p is any proposition, is
the proposition which is the contradictory of p, that is, the proposition asserting that p is not true. This is denoted by ‘∼p’.
Thus ‘∼p’ is the contradictory function with ‘p’ as argument and means the negation of the proposition p. It will also be
referred to as the proposition ‘not-p’. Thus ‘∼p’ means ‘not-p,’ which means the negation of ‘p”’ [99, p. 6].
If Grice is right, Modernism must ﬁnd some ‘divergence’ between ‘not’ and “∼”. It’s not easy to identify one particular
feature that may count as an example of this ‘divergence’ (but cf. Cohen [14]). In any case, the Modernist approach, as
viewed by Grice, would consist of dealing with any such divergence as a ‘metaphysical excrescence’ of “not” – from which
“∼” is by deﬁnition detached. Russell’s particular interest was the role of “∼” in association with a deﬁnite description,
which he took to yield an essentially scopal ambiguity, with “The king of France is not bald” corresponding either to
‘∃x(Kx & ∀y(K y → y = x) & ∼Bx)’ or to ‘∼∃x(Kx & ∀y(K y → y = x) & Bx)’, of which only the latter is a contradictory of
“The king of France is bald”.
Boole uses “-” for contradictory negation, alluding to arithmetical subtraction. “Whatever class of objects is represented
by the symbol x, the contrary class will be expressed by ‘1 − x’ ” (“man, not-man”). Boolean negation is classical negation.
However, it has been argued that Boole’s is Modernism gone wrong, arguably leading to logically uninterpretable expressions
in the course of calculating logical equations according to the model of arithmetic.
The Modernist program then is to provide a standard for the class of valid inferences concerning a formal device. This
is the idea of a system, such as ﬁrst-order predicate calculus. The range of valid inferences will be deﬁned by the syntactic
and semantic components. We shall proceed accordingly. (With the addition of a pragmatic component, the system can be
integrated into a complete ‘semiosis’.)
5. Semiosis for negation
The epitome of a ﬁrst-oder formal predicate calculus (as proposed by the Formalists) is something like System G (Sys-
tem GHP). (We take the idea from George Myro [73] and offer this ‘highly powerful’/‘hopefully plausible’ version of his
system G.) What a system like System G does is to provide a syntactic and semantic component for various formal devices,
including “∼”.
6. Syntax for negation
By syntax is understood both the ‘formation’ rule and the ‘inference’ rules (introduction and elimination) before they get
a semantic interpretation. (Grice’s own system relies heavily on Mates’s Elementary Logic.) A syntax-sensitive formation rule
for “∼” indicates the order in which the formal device is introduced with respect to the pre-radical. This will be of use in
explaining away the alleged divergence between “∼” and “not” in terms of implicature and ‘scopal ambiguity’. Grice [28,
p. 126] mentions similar work on these scope indicators by Charles D. Parsons and George Boolos:
If φ[n] is a formula, ∼n+m ϕ is a formula.
The apparently simple formation rule already seems to commit the system to a purely sentential account of negation. It
suggests that by default negation will be assigned maximal scope. (Non-maximal scope would yield a subscript other than
“n+m”.)
What the formation rule does is transform a negation-free ‘radical’ into a radical containing negation. At this point Grice
plays with algebraic and chemico-physical terminology. The “∼p” formula is construed as ‘radical’ (in fact symbolized as
“√∼p”; [34, p. 59]). Grice’s analogy here is to chemistry, where a radical is “an atom or group of atoms regarded as a (or
the) primary constituent of a compound or class of compounds, remaining unaltered during chemical reactions in which
other constituents are added or removed. . . An individual atom or element as a constituent of a compound was formerly
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“∼” as a negaton. As such, “∼”, while having maximal scope within the formula, remains internal to any ‘illocutionary force’
operator that can be appended at a later stage (“	 √∼p”, “!√∼p”). Again, having this clearly in mind at the ‘formation-rule’
stage allows us to explain some tricky interfaces between mode-operators and negation as being ultimately implicatural.
For visual clariﬁcation Grice uses here the algebraic radical sign (√) “	 √∼p”. In Myro’s terminology, “p” is the negatum
of “∼p” and vice versa. The word had been used before to indicate one of the modi of the proposition. “Now aﬃrmatum
and negatum, verum, . . . are . . . words of art, for indeed they belong to logic. They call these modals, because the modus
is the genus” (Richardson, The Logician’s Schoolmaster, 1629, p. 261). With relation to “	 √∼p”, Grice follows Moravcsik in
referring to 	 as the mode (modus). The modus has been interpreted by some earlier logicians as involving “∼”: “The former
is termed the dictum; the latter the modus . . . And in general, modal propositions are aﬃrmative or negative, according as
the modus is aﬃrmed, or denied of the dictum” [6, p. 45].
While the root sign obviously arises ultimately from algebra, the direct source is the analogy with the radical in chem-
istry, since it appears in more complex structures. Note that the Modernist ‘formation rule’ has “∼” as an external aﬃx to
a propositional complex. This is very much in the Stoic and Fregean (rather than the Aristotelian, or later the Montagovian)
tradition; cf. Horn [47, Chapter 7].
The negated radical “∼p” is the απο´αςις, of the Stoics (“Not: it is day”), which they carefully distinguished from
statements like “No one is walking” (αρνησις), and “This man is unkind” (στηρερις, privatio). (See Mates [67], Horn [47,
§1.1.2] for more on the Stoic negation.) It is a good exercise to ﬁnd the negatum of these other types of utterance to see
whether they all reduce to a formula containing “∼”.
The formation rule also leans towards Asymmetrism. A formula “ϕ”, which does not contain negation, is the base for a
new formula which does. “ϕ” is far from being a full-ﬂedged ‘aﬃrmation’. That is, precisely, the whole point of invoking
the notion of ‘radical’ instead. But the idea is there. In this, System G is traditional; cf. Coke [15]: “The aﬃrmation is before,
and more worthy then [sic] the negation. Denying or negative is which divideth the consequent subject from the antecedent
predicate, as, “Good works do not justiﬁe”, “A man is not a stone”. That a proposition may be a negative, it is necessary that
the particle of denying be either set before the whole proposition: as “No elect are damned”, or be immediately added to
the coupler [sic], and verb adjective that hath the proce of the coupler or band; as: “Marriage is not a sacrament”, “Works
justiﬁe not” ”.
The formation rule presupposes that “∼” applies to a constituent, to form a ‘radix’, which is still ‘mode-less’, neither
assertoric nor non-assertoric. Furthermore, there is no allusion in the formation rule to anything like the copula. The same
formation rule of propositional calculus is used in the formation rule of predicate calculus. Modernism aims at simplifying
some of the sempiternal worries of the Traditionalists. Thus, Hobbes famously held that ‘not’ attaches to the predicate. (For
a view of Hobbes as a proto-Gricean, in the analysis of propositions like “That man is not a stone” in terms of utterer’s
intentions, see Speranza [91], following Hacking.)
When applying the mode operator to the radical (as in “	 √∼p” and “!√∼p”), Modernism also simpliﬁes an account
such as Frege’s, for whom “	” is a complex sign, with “|” and “—” representing judgement and content respectively. For that
matter, no such complexity is preserved either in systems with mode-operators like “
” that some have proposed for the
sign of ‘illocutionary denegation’ – as in “ 
 p” (as in “I deny that it’s raining”) or “¡p” for prohibition (as in “No parking”);
cf. Searle [88] and related work, and Horn [47] for a critique of the “speech act” of negation.
But ‘deny’ is a mere ‘expositive’ used “naturally, but no longer necessarily, to refer to conversational interchange” [3,
p. 162]. In Grice’s terminology, ‘deny’ would constitute a ‘central’, rather than ‘peripheral’, speech act; indeed, so central
that it’s part of the radical (Austin’s phatic or even rhetic: cf. Grice [32, p. 122]).
In a system like G, the interface between these mode-operators and their negated radicals must be accounted for im-
plicaturally: “	 √∼(p & q)”, “	 √∼(pvq)”, and “	 √∼(p → q)”. Their ‘neustic’ equivalents, “√ 
 (p & q), “√ 
 (pvq)”, and
“∼(√ 
 (p → q))” are either ill-formed or misleadingly incorporate what is part of the implicatum into logical form. “I deny
that she had a child and got married: she got married and had a child”, etc.
The idea of a phrastic φ as a negatum in a more complex formula “∼ϕ” can be traced back at least to Richardson [85,
p. 261]: “Now negatum is a word of art, for indeed it belongs to Logic”. Cf. “A proposition is negative when the modus is
denied of the dictum” [6, p. 45]. Grice’s anatomy of negation as a sub-atomic particle thus has its logical historiography.
As Bentham subtly expresses it, a proposition is negative not when the dictum is denied, but rather when “the modus is
denied of the dictum” [6, p. 45]. (As an exercise, the reader may attempt to deny the dictum without denying the modus).
Interestingly, the dictum is re-introduced in Oxonian parlance by R.M. Hare (cited by Grice, [30, p. 50] as a member of
the Play-Group) to refer to the phrastic or radical. In other logical treatises, we ﬁnd, as we do in Richardson’s Logician’s
School-Master, negation characterized as a “mode” (modus) of a proposition, affecting its quality. The contrast is between the
modus – what Grice will have as the mode-sign, and the early Hare will have as the ‘dictor’ – and the dictum, which Grice
will have as the radical (the negatum). Keeping the chemical analogy, we may refer to “∼” as the negatron.
It is not transparent how the radix/modus distinction should apply in contexts like, ‘The king of France is not bald’. Hare
maintains that “not”, as represented by “∼”, is part of the radical. Most Formalists would reject as nonsense a formula
such as “∼ 	 √p”. Negation, rather, is ‘part of what is asserted’; “that is, that we assert either that the cat is on the mat,
or that the cat is not on the mat” (Hare [36, p. 25]; cf. Frege [21] for a precursor of this view). Grice’s ‘radical’ connects
with Hare’s views. Hare had used dictum, dictor and dictive for what he later refers to as the ‘phrastic’ vs. the ‘neustic’
(“	 √∼(ιx)(Kx & Bx)”).
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that. . .” can be used as an illocutionary-force indicator, and can be negated. However, in a system like G, it cannot be
negated and used as an illocutionary force indicator.
Formation rules for negation are bound to become more complicated in the predicate calculus by incorporating the
copula. For Locke, is not disconnects the subject from the predicate, and is “the general mark of the mind, denying” (cf.
Duncan [20]). By ‘annexing the negative particle not’ to the copula is, the mind “disjoins the subject idea from the predicate
idea according to the result of its [the mind’s] perceptions”. The negative particle not is inserted after the copula, to signify
the disagreement between the subject and the predicate. (Similar ideas date back to Peter of Spain [78,80,79]; Kretzmann
[63]; O’Donnell [75].)
Note that the formation rule of System G gives the squiggle maximal scope, and the issue of whether not attaches to
the ‘copula’ is not even raised. But the issue was raised by Duncan [20], whose solution involves the idea of a negative
pregnant, complete with a proto-theory of implicature cancellation:
Perhaps it may still appear a mystery how the copula can be said to be part of a negative proposition, whose proper
business it is to disjoin ideas. This diﬃculty however will vanish, if we call to mind that a negation implies an aﬃrmation.
Aﬃrmations are of two kinds, viz. of agreement or disagreement. Where perceptions disagree, there we must call in the
negative particle not, and this gives us to understand, that the aﬃrmation implied in the copula is not of any connection
between the subject and predicate, but of their mutual opposition and repugnance.
JeLogicians working before the advent of Formalism seemed to have diﬃculties in deciding just what it is that not
attaches to. Locke terms not a particle (syncategorematon), rather than an ‘adverb’. Again, it’s Duncan [20] who adds the
proto-Gricean ﬂavor of psychological intentions. A negation is the disjoining of the subject idea and the predicate idea (“The
law is not an ass”): “But as this is the very reverse of what is intended, a negative mark is added, to shew that this union
does not here take place”.
The formation rule for “∼”, as it stands, should be qualiﬁed for sub-clausal structures (e.g. “The cat which is not black is
not on the mat”). Duncan [20] considers the entailments due to the embedding of not. His example: ‘The man who departs
not from an upright behaviour, is beloved by God”. The predicate, beloved of God, is evidently aﬃrmed of the subject, so that
notwithstanding the negative particle in the subordinate, the proposition is still aﬃrmative.
Logicians working with the idea of the copula explain the canonical use of ‘not’ as an element of ‘repugnance’ attaching
to the copula or a functionally equivalent predicate. Thus Coke [15, p. 107]:
That a Proposition may be a Negative, it is necessary that the Particle of denying be either set before the whole Propo-
sition, as, No Elect are damned; or be immediately added to the Coupler [sic], and Verb adjective [sic] that hath the
force of the Coupler, or Band, as, Marriage is not a sacrament; Works justiﬁe not. Every true Negation, hangs on a true
Aﬃrmation: For it could not rightly be said, Works justiﬁe not unless it were true, that Faith onely justiﬁeth.
The second ingredient that System G incorporates in the syntax for not is the doublet of introduction and elimination
rules. Since Gentzen, it has been the received view of Formalism and Modernism that these are the only two rules or
procedures constraining the inferential behaviour of ‘not’. These are syntactic procedures in that they precede a full-ﬂedged
model interpretation (e.g. via a truth-table for the propositional calculus). Any such pair of introduction and elimination
rules should be in principle be harmonious and stable.
7. Reductio ad absurdum
System G standardly adopts reductio ad absurdum as the introduction of negation:
If ϕ1[m],ϕ2, . . . , ϕk 	 ψ[n−l] &n ∼[n−k] ψ[n−k−l] , then ϕ2, . . . ϕk 	∼n+l ϕ ’.
(Grice [28, p. 126]; cf. Myro [73, p. 89])
Reductio ad absurdum can be traced back to the Eleatics, particularly Zeno and his epicheirema. Aristotle has this as η εις
το αδυνατον απαγογη – reductio ad impossibilem, rather than ad absurdum – and it was ﬁrst used in (Latinized) English by
Isaac Watts: “reducing [the respondent] to an absurdity . . . is called reductio ad absurdum”. (The Improvement of Mind, 1741.)
8. Duplex Negatio Aﬃrmat
System GHP also adopts the standard rule for the elimination of “∼”:
∼n+k∼n φ[n−m] 	 ϕ .
(Grice [28, p. 126], cf. Myro [73, p. 62])
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The introduction and the elimination rules should provide for a harmonious system. Griss [35] has argued that math-
ematical discourse can do without negation. In other words, negation in mathematical discourse is either introduced in a
stronger way than by reductio ad absurdum or it cannot simply eliminated via the law of double negation. Faced with what
is argued to be a system both unharmonious and unstable, Griss opts for a ‘negationless’ system.
Dummett [19, p. 291] has explored the entailments of a system like G that includes RAA and DNE as introduction and
elimination of negation: “Plainly, the classical rule [of elimination, DNE] is not in harmony with the introduction rule”. So
there is a requirement of harmony that the classical logician thinks she fulﬁlls and the intuitionist logician thinks she does
not. Dummett relates the harmony requirement with the stability requirement. “The negation-elimination rule, . . . validates
negation introduction, which, however, fails to validate negation-elimination. This was a situation we did not envisage when
we discussed stability” [19, p. 293]. In view of the problems brought about by negation, some intuitionist logicians, such
as Griss, speak of ‘negationless’ systems. We are treating together different accounts of ‘anti-realist’ negation, taking Griss
as the paradigm. In contrast, Grice and system G is realist. “Since different notions of incompatibility are being used [by
Griss and Grice], there is no sound objection to the claim that the semantic value of classical negation is determined” [77,
p. 165].
9. Semantics for negation
The second component of a formal system for negation is the semantic one. The constraints that system G so far has
incorporated are syntactical ones. They characterize not by its internal role in the system, regardless of any meaning it may
be intended to contribute. The question arises as to whether a purely syntactical account is suﬃcient. In any case, narrowly
construed, the semantic constraint for not should create no big metaphysical problem. It must support the classical truth-
table for what Whitehead and Russell deﬁne as the ‘contradictory function’.
It is with the semantic component at play that a system like G provides a defense of truth-functionality. Qua truth-
functional operator, and ‘when given a standard, classical two-valued interpretation’ [32, p. 22], not is a toggling operator,
reversing the truth-value of its constituent radical:
ϕ is Corr(1) on Z iff if ϕ = ∼nψ , ψ is Corr(0) on Z .
(Grice [28, p. 136], cf. Myro [73, p. 43])
(‘Corr(1)’ and ‘Corr(0)’ are abbreviations, respectively for ‘correlated with 1’ and ‘correlated with 0’.) The aim is the
standard one, as in the comment “It seems a fair reﬂection of ordinary usage to identify the negation of p with any
statement “∼p” which is so related to p that if either is true it follows that the other is false”. (Ayer [4, p. 42])
Note that System G allows for three other unary truth-functors: “ϕ is Corr(1) on Z iff if ϕ = Tnψ , ψ is Corr(1) on Z ”,
“ϕ is Corr(0) on Z iff if ϕ = Pnψ , ψ is Corr(1) on Z ”, and “ϕ is Corr(0) on Z iff if ϕ = Qnψ , ψ is Corr(1) on Z ”. The choice
of “∼” over the other three unary ‘formal devices’ seems to be a matter of notational convenience or pragmatics.
Neo-Traditionalism has long understood negation in semantic terms, even when dealing with tricks like vacuous descrip-
tors or names. Consider the implicatures (or entanglements) expressed by Oxford logic tutor Simon of Faversham (Simon de
Daversiham):
“Ponatur in casu, et est possible, quod Socrates non sit, haec ergo est falsa ‘Socrates est’, et similiter haec erit falsa
Socrates non est (iustus), Signiﬁcaretur enim quod Socrates, qui est, non est; sed hoc est falsum; ergo et haec est falsa
‘Socrates non est’; ergo haec sunt simul falsa ‘Socrates est’ et ‘Socrates non est’, et haec sunt contradictoria, ergo contra-
dictoria essent simul falsa; hoc est impossibile” Ditto Nullus homo est animal, ‘sive homo sit sive homo non sit’ est falsa.
Cuius probation est quia quaelibet universalis negativa includit in se tres habitudinem, quonian includit unam habi-
tudinem quæest prædicati ad subiectum, et aliam quæest subiecti ad quodlibet suppositum, tertia quæest praedicata ad
quodlibet suppositum. Prima habitudo negativa est, secunda aﬃrmativa, tertiam negativa. Prima habitudo signiﬁcatur per
maiorem, secunda per minorem, tertia autem per conclusionem; et ideo in omni universali negativa virtute includitur
forma syllogismi; et ideo qui dicit quod nullus homo est animal et quod quodlibet suppositum hominis est homo et
quod quodlibet suppositum hominis non est animal, dicit in minore quod quodlibet suppositum hominis est homo. Esse
signiﬁcatum habent ea de quibus intellectus aliquid negat.
While Grice refers to both Modernism and Neo-Traditionalism as agreeing that there are (or more fastidiously put,
‘appear to be’) divergences between “∼” (as deﬁned in the calculus so far) and not, it is not to easy to come up with
an example of a Modernist explicitly alleging so. The straightforward deﬁnition of negation as the contradictory function
adopted by Whitehead and Russell and later by Quine offers the standard approach.
Grice colourfully ascribes to the Modernist the prejudice any such divergence will be a ‘metaphysical excrescence’ [32,
p. 23]. It seems far easier to ﬁnd illustrations of the alleged divergence from the rival group of Neo-Traditionalism. Histori-
cally, too, Grice’s reply was explicitly provoked by the Neo-Traditionalist discourse, rather than the Modernist one.
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If Modernism is concerned with classical logic, Neo-Traditionalism might be viewed as romantic, although in many ways
the latter is more faithful to Aristotelian foundations than is the former, at least in spirit. The vademecum here is Strawson’s
Introduction to Logical Theory [96], best seen as a direct attack on Russell’s Modernism (but also Quine’s logical Puritanism).
Interestingly, it was inﬂuenced by early views by Grice. In the preface, Strawson explicitly cites Grice as the person “from
whom I have never ceased to learn about logic since he was my tutor in the subject” [96, p. v], and in an important
footnote notes that it was “Mr. H.P. Grice” who demonstrated to him “the operation of a pragmatic rule” preﬁguring Grice’s
own maxim of quantity: “One should not make the (logically) less, when one could truthfully (and with greater or equal
clarity) make the greater claim” (Strawson [96, p. 179]). Strawson later recollected: “The nature of the logical constants of
standard logic was a question that H.P. Grice and I used to discuss in the early 1950s, and I have no doubt that [some of
Strawson’s essays were] inﬂuenced by those discussions” [97, p. 10]. And again, later, “I had the pleasure of listening to
Grice expounding the essentials of his view [on logical constants] in a paper read to the Philosophical Society in Oxford in
the late 1950s” (Strawson [97, p. 16]).
While it is diﬃcult to pinpoint to an explicit reference by Modernists on the alleged divergence between “not” and “∼”,
Grice’s favorite Neo-Traditionalist is clear on this. Indeed, a sub-section of the Introduction (Part II, ch. 3, 2§7) bears the title,
“‘∼’ and ‘not”’. Granted, Strawson’s main caveats are not with “∼” but with some of the binary truth-functors (notably the
conditional). However, his Neo-Traditionalism seems to adopt a focus on ‘use’ rather than ‘meaning’.
By focusing on contradiction as one of the primary and standard uses of “∼”, Strawson underlines the role of negation
in discourse. The use or function of “∼” (and not) is to “exclude”. It is “a device used when we wish to contradict a previous
assertion”. But also when we wish “to correct a possible false impression, or to express the contrast between what had been
expected, feared, suggested, or hoped, and the reality”. [. . .] “A standard and primary use of not is speciﬁcally to contradict,
or correct; to cancel a suggestion of one’s own or another” [96, p. 7]. And later: “A standard and primary use of not in a
sentence is to assert the contradictory of the statement which would be made by the use, in the same context, of the same
sentence without the word not” [96, p. 79].
Strawson does include a caveat aimed apparently at something like the formation rule of Modernism (“if ϕ is a formula,
∼ϕ is a formula”): “Of course, we must not suppose that the insertion of not anywhere in any sentence always has this
effect”. His example, adapted from Aristotle: “Some bulls are not dangerous” is not the contradictory, but the subcontrary,
of “Some bulls are dangerous”. “This is why the identiﬁcation of ‘∼’ with it is not the case that is to be preferred to its
identiﬁcation with not simpliciter”.
Strawson [96, p. 79] continues: “This identiﬁcation [of not and “∼”], then, involves only those minimum departures from
the logic of ordinary language which must always result from the formal logician’s activity of codifying rules with the help
of verbal patterns: viz., the adoption of a rigid rule when ordinary language permits variations and deviations from the
standard use (“∼ ∼p → p”, “p ∨ ∼p”) and that stretching of the sense of ‘exemplify’ which allows us, e.g., to regard ‘Tom
is not mad’ as well as ‘Not all bulls are dangerous’ as exempliﬁcations of ‘not-p”’. Divergences notwithstanding, Strawson
concludes the section, “So we shall call ‘∼’ the negation sign, and read ‘∼’ as ‘not”’.
Strawson goes on to attack the Modernist (chieﬂy Russellian) account of deﬁnite descriptions. With Grice, we shall focus
our discussion on the negation of vacuous descriptors (“The King of France is not bald”). The attack is premised on the
assumption that negation, normally or invariably, leaves the subject ‘unimpaired’. For Modernism, as reﬂected in System G,
the negation of a sentence containing a vacuous descriptor comes out as true. For Strawson, if what is presupposed is not
satisﬁed, “The king of France is not bald” is not true. It’s not false, either, but rather a pointless thing to say, the question
of whose truth or falsity fails to arise. For Grice, Modernism is essentially correct: “The king of France is not bald”, in the
absence of the king of France, is true. (But cf. Grice [29] for a somewhat more complex picture.) What Strawson takes as
praesuppositum is merely an implicatum (and never an entailment). Strawson does recognize the marginal existence of a
non-presupposing negation, as in the exchange “Does he care about it?” “—He neither cares nor does not care. He’s dead”
[96, p. 18]. For the true Modernist, the only correct answer would be: “No, he does not care about it. He is dead”. By
and large, however, Strawson takes both aﬃrmative and negative statements featuring vacuous descriptors to result in a
‘truth-value gap’ (in Quine’s happy parlance).
It is not obvious that Grice’s opposition between the Modernists and the Neo-Traditionalists is an exclusive one. For one,
it is diﬃcult to place in either camp an author such as A.J. Ayer, “at [some] time the enfant terrible of Oxford philosophy”
[30, p. 48], later Wykeham Professor of Logic, and the author of an inﬂuential essay on ‘Negation’. In any case, Ayer seems
to assume that negation carries something of a metaphysical excrescence, and should not for this be eliminated from a
system. “A statement is negative if it states that an object lacks a certain property rather than stating that it possesses the
complementary property. A statement is negative if it states that a certain property is not instantiated, rather than stating
that the complementary property is universally instantiated” [4, p. 61].
11. Robbing Peter to pay Paul
As noted, Grice’s aim is a synthesis between Modernism and Neo-Traditionalism, and one crucial issue is what we may
call the identity or isomorphism thesis, the claim that there is no divergence (in terms of entailment and valid inference)
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who have held such a divergence to exist.
Strawson has been quite explicit as to the origin of his views on negation: his disputes with Grice at the Oxford Philo-
sophical Society, and earlier, in the premises of St. John’s, where Grice ‘– from whom I have never ceased to learn logic’
– was his tutor. For Grice, the assumption that there is a divergence between “∼” and “not” “seemed to me to rest on a
blurring of the logical/pragmatic distinction” [32, p. 374]. The “general rule of linguistic conduct” that Strawson [96, p. 179]
borrows from Grice was developed by the latter in his William James lectures into a fully ﬂedged set of maxims within
an overarching Co-operative Principle (“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs”). These maxims are sorted into four Kantian categories: Quantity (“Make your contribution as informative as is
required (for the current purpose of the exchange)”, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”);
Quality (“Try to make your contribution one that is true, Do not say what you believe to be false, Do not say that for
which you lack adequate evidence”), Relation (“Be relevant”), and Manner (“Be perspicuous” – Avoid obscurity of expres-
sion, Avoid ambiguity, Be brief, Be orderly). In his posthumously published retrospective epilogue, Grice [32, p. 273] adds a
tenth submaxim, ‘Facilitate your reply’, expanding the system into a conversational decalogue; cf. Speranza [92,93].
This program is presented within ‘Logic and Conversation’, the William James lectures Grice presented at Harvard in the
spring term of 1967. It is in the ‘Prolegomena’ that Grice explicitly refers to Strawson [96] as an “A-philosopher”, i.e., as a
philosopher who would advance a non-classical semantic or conventional account for various phenomena for which Grice
offers an independently required pragmatic, non-conventional approach to supplement the standard Modernist treatment.
Among the “A-philosophers”, i.e. the Oxford Neo-Traditionalists or Informalists ranged on Strawson’s side, we could place
other members of the Play-Group, such as H.L.A. Hart, J.O. Urmson, and G.J. Warnock, as well as (on occasion) the group
leader J.L. Austin himself.
The dispute concerns the divergence between a given formal device (e.g. “⊃”, the horseshoe) and its vulgar counterpart
(‘if’) – a topic that was being hotly debated at Oxford and elsewhere (cf. Speranza [93] on J.F Thomson’s ‘In defence of the
material conditional’ and Horn [47, pp. 378–379] on the role of assertability in Grice’s – and Dummett’s – characterization
of negated conditionals). But for Grice the battle has many fronts of equal importance, examples that “involve an area of
special interest to me, namely that of expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical constants
and which may, or may not, ‘diverge’ in meaning from the related constants, considered as elements in a classical logic,
standardly interpreted” [32, p. 8].
In the second lecture, as we have seen, Grice explicitly tackles the ‘∼’/not pair. His broadens the target of attack, though.
It is not just Neo-Traditionalists like Strawson who have claimed that such a divergence exists, but some of the Modernists
themselves. In this respect, Grice might be considered post-modern. Grice begins his discussion in ‘Logic and Conversation’
by challenging the acceptance of such a divergence on the part of both Modernism and Neo-Traditionalism as a “common-
place”; rather, he maintains, “the common assumption of the contestants that the divergences do in fact exist is (broadly
speaking) a common mistake” [32, p. 24]. But this divergence is typically seen as relatively innocent in the case of negation,
compared to that of the (material) conditional and the other binary connectives.
Over a century ago, Russell provided “∼” (borrowed from Peano) to be read as not. The common garden variety of
logic manual will typically accept such an identiﬁcation. Thus note, for example, Benson Mates’s treatment of negation in
his Elementary Logic [68], and back in Oxford, David Mitchell in An Introduction to Logic. In the section dealing with ‘The
interpretation of the constants’ in Chapter 2, Mitchell [71, p. 59] agrees with Strawson that, in contrast with some of the
binary truth functors, “ “∼” raises no [major] diﬃculties as the sign for propositional negation, used in conjunction with
either propositions, as ‘∼(Tom is Australian)’, or propositional forms. It may be read as not”.
Or compare Suppes on “∼(Sugar causes tooth decay)”: “The usual method of asserting the negation is to attach not to the
main verb. We shall use ‘∼’ ”. He enlists with those who perceive a divergence here, and has a caveat regarding the ∼ /not
identiﬁcation. “Of course, the rich, variegated character of natural language guarantees that in many contexts [“not” is] used
in delicately shaded, non-truth-functional ways. Loss in subtlety of nuance seems a necessary concomitant to developing a
precise, symbolic analysis of sentences” [98, p. 4]. Suppes seems to be one logician who learned from the mistake, if he
ever made it, and from Grice’s treatment (see his contribution to the Gricean festschrift in Grandy and Warner [26]).
The strategy of the conversationalist manoeuvre is to explain away the divergence between ‘∼’ and ‘not’ via conver-
sational implicature. A requirement for this strategy, though, is that we possess a more or less deﬁnite account of what
“∼” already means in a system like system G. System G is an axiomatic calculus of the type made familiar by Whitehead
and Russell which validates the inferential roles that “∼” can take. In this, Grice proves a conservative dissident parting
ways with the tradition in Oxford that had been, in matters logical, to follow in the footsteps of the neo-Hegelians or the
Informalism of “no calculus” favored by Ryle and Strawson. The Modernism of Whitehead/Russell (and Quine’s Logical Pu-
ritanism as an offspring) had never taken root in Oxford (cf. Urmson and Warnock), and it has done so only recently with
the institution of the chair of “Mathematical Logic” (Merton College and the Mathematical Institute).
12. What the eye no longer sees the heart no longer grieves for
The defense of Modernism as providing an adequate account of the explicit logical force of “not” proceeds by drawing a
distinction between a ‘logical inference’ and a ‘pragmatic inference’ [32, p. 374]. Pragmatic inferences thus fall outside the
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concerns the implicit content of ‘not’ rather than its contribution to truth-conditions.
Overall, Grice’s sympathies were with the Modernists. He acknowledges his attraction to ‘the tidiness of Modernist logic’
[32, p. 374]. More importantly, he notes that his additions are not meant to provide departures from the standard Modernist
apparatus: “Even if it should prove necessary to supplement the apparatus of Modernist logic with additional conventional
devices, such supplementation [should be regarded as] undramatic and innocuous”. These will typically involve “bracketing
or scope devices” (“What the eye no longer sees. . .”). The strategy is to enrich the syntax (rather than the semantics) by
adding the formal device. In this way, the alleged divergence between “∼” and “not” will be one of pragmatic import, which
can be eliminated once the scope device is put to use.
Grice’s observation regarding the credo of both Modernism and Neo-Traditionalism as resting on a mistake may itself be
interpreted in a similar way by reducing the alleged semantic property of natural language “not” to a complex of a syntactic
property and a pragmatic property.
It should be noted that the terminology of ‘pragmatic’ is already used by Strawson (“Some will say these points are
irrelevant to logic (are ‘merely pragmatic’)”) [96, p. 179]. On this, and Grice’s view, it’s only the syntax and the semantics
for ‘not’ as “∼” which account for the ‘logical’ inferences. Any further divergence will pertain to ‘pragmatic inference’. The
point is always to simplify the logic, even if the explanation must still be provided. As it has been said [66, p. 215], “Grice
saves” – but there’s no such thing as a free lunch.
At this point, we may provide an inventory of issues which have traditionally been considered part of the logic of
negation, but which we can be recalibrated as pragmatic. We need some order for the inventory. We have already touched
on those alleged divergences concerning the formal treatment of “∼”. We continue with other inferences that do not pertain
to the formal system of negation but which have nevertheless been included by some as regarding the logic of “not”. In all
cases, the idea is to provide an equi-vocal account of “not”.
One issue arises with the negation of sentences containing vacuous descriptors. System G deems “The king of France is
not bald” as true in the context of a French republic. This analysis contrasts with the Parmenidean, Platonic and neo-Platonic
accounts. Parmenidean negation creates a Meinongian jungle, in which the non-being of the King of France is not directly
referred to. The problem is not particularly solved by Plato and his proposal to analyze “not” as “other than”. “The king of
France is not bald, but other than bald” allows for the cancellation, “indeed he is non-existent” – but somehow one does
not think that is what Plato had in mind.
A related problem which was emphasized by Ryle is the negation of category (or as Grice has them, ‘eschatological’)
mistakes. While ‘Virtue is square’ is false, ‘Virtue is not a square’ comes out as trivially true, if only a redundant – if not
downright irrelevant – thing to say in most contexts (but cf. ‘Virtue is not square, but some windows are’ vs. ‘Virtue is not
square, indeed virtue does not exist’). (See Horn [47, §2.3] for a review of some of the relevant literature.)
“System G” allows for two syntactic devices to signal scopal ambiguity and avoid lexical ambiguity. The central manoe-
vure of the pragmatic component of System G is the introduction of the notion of implicature. Implicature contrasts with
entailment but also with explicit content: “Whatever is implied . . . is distinct from what is said” [32, p. 24]. When ﬁrst
(re)introduced into the philosophical literature, and thence into the consciousness of linguists, presupposition and implica-
ture each appeared in turn as the meaning relation that dare not speak its name, as The Other: an inference licensed in a
given context that cannot be identiﬁed with logical implication or entailment. Thus Strawson [95]:
To say, “The king of France is wise” is, in some sense of “imply” to imply that there is a king of France. But this is a very
special and odd sense of “imply”. “Implies” in this sense is certainly not equivalent to “entails” (or “logically implies”).
Two years later, this ‘special and odd sense of “imply”’ is recast as the neo-Fregean notion of presupposition. Similarly,
when Grice ﬁrst discusses (what would later be called) implicature, he begins by carving out a use of imply: “If someone
says ‘My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom’ it would normally be implied that he did not know in which of the
two rooms she was” [27, p. 130]. Later, Grice makes a similar move to a more specialized and less ambiguous term: “I wish
to introduce as terms of art, the verb ‘implicate’ and the related nouns ‘implicature’ (cf. implying) and ‘implicatum’ (cf.
what is implied)” [32, p. 24]. (Latin implicat is ambiguous, and Suedonius had already used implicatura for ‘entanglement’
(Short/Lewis, Latin Dictionary). Other members of the Play-Group had employed similar notions under various names, e.g.
Nowell-Smith [74] (and later Hungerland [56]) on “contextual implication”. (See the discussion in relation to Grice and
Strawson in Horn [48].)
The distinction among species of implication within the overall genus of inferential relations is of particular relevance
for the study of negation. In his inﬂuential Statement and Inference (posthum., [102]), Cook Wilson considers the distinction
between ‘asserting’ and ‘implying’ or ‘presupposing’: “A negative statement normally presupposes the existence of their
subjects of attribution; this existence is not asserted by the negative statement as such” [102, p. 259]. Ryle [87] makes a
distinction between ‘asserting’ and, not implying (or implicating) but presupposing. It is not altogether clear whether these
logicians have identiﬁed what exactly it is that is implied, presupposed, asserted, or implicated in the issuing of a negation.
“[E]limination may precede and not ensue upon the discovery of the required [positive] fact. But even when what enables
me to assert ‘A is not B’ is the knowledge that A is C, the assertion ‘A is not B’ is different from the assertion ‘A is C”
. . . When I say the “The hat is not green (but some other colour),” I am (not stating but) presupposing that the hat is
coloured . . . It is known and presupposed that the Determinable ‘being assertion coloured’ characterizes the hat, [but] the
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hat, asserts of this it is one of the Determinates of the Determinable ‘being coloured’ other than the given Determate B”
(all quotes from Ryle [87, pp. 85–87], emphasis added). This relates to the medieval doctrine of suppositio and the ‘negative
pregnant’, discussed below. Part of the manoeuvre is to restate what has been already noted by medieval logicians. Insightful
treatments of negative utterances in terms of their presuppositions or implicatures can be found in work by Peter of Spain
([78,79], Spruyt [94]) and William of Sherwood [75,63], among others.
Implicature serves to explain the medieval theory of the ‘negative pregnant’, “a negative implying or involving an aﬃr-
mative. As is a man being impleaded, to have done a thing upon such a day, or in such a place, denyeth that he did it modo
& forma declarata: which implyeth nevertheless that in some sort he did it” (Cowell [16]). As argued in Horn [47, Chap-
ter 3], this notion of an aﬃrmative supposition or ground underlying a negative statement must be analyzed as a Gricean
implicature, not an entailment (or a Fregean or Strawsonian presupposition).
13. Negation as otherness
Following a suggestion by Cook Wilson, Grice [32, p. 75] looks for an analysis [or another term?] that can be speciﬁcally
assigned to both “∼” and “not”. The idea of ‘not’ as shorthand for ‘other than’ is taken up by Grice. “As regards not: if our
language did not contain a unitary device, there would be many things we can now say which we should be then unable
to say, unless (1) the language contained some very artiﬁcial-looking connective like one or other of the strokes [i.e. the
Sheffer ‘not both’ stroke or the joint denial ‘neither-nor’], or (2) we put ourselves to a good deal of trouble to ﬁnd (more or
less case by case) complicated forms of expression involving such expressions as other than or incompatible with” [32, p. 68].
In the case of ‘incompatible with’, consider the “reduction” of “∼p” to “p | p”. Rather than “The king of France is not
bald” we would have, “The king of France is bald is incompatible with the king of France being bald”. In the case of ‘other
than’, philosophers since Plato have tried without notable success to ﬁnd the appropriate ‘complicated’ form. In Platonic
parlance, it’s το διαορον, or το ετερον. Plato saw this as part of a problem for his ideationist theory of meaning. If for any
object m, there is a meaning relation such that m means (idea) M, the issue is to ﬁnd the correlation for a ‘judgment’ that
denies an attribute to an object (Sophist 357B). There have been various attempts to formalize what Plato is up to. Wiggins
[100] converts “∼FLY(Theaetetus)” into a Platonic rendering as ‘There is a property P such that P(FLY) & P(Theaetetus)’,
where  stands for διαορον; cf. also Bostock [8, p. 115]. The relationship between Parmenidean and Platonic conceptions
of negations and non-being is examined in Pelletier [81].
Note that “Theaetetus is not big” cannot simply be reduced to the assertion ‘Theaetetus is small’ [δελουν]. For one
thing, as Plato recognized (Sophist 257Dff.), he may be medium-sized, whence the position that ‘Theaetetus is not big’
explicitly means ‘Theaetetus is other than big’ (leaving aside those cases in which Theaetetus does not exist). Negation as
otherness is invoked as well by Mill [69]: “Negative names are employed whenever we have occasion to speak collectively
of all things other than some thing or class of things.” While Grice, and before him, Wilson and Ryle, are more or less in
agreement with an account of “not” that allows for its identiﬁcation with “∼”, with any mismatch handled via implicature,
the question is trickier for the neo-Idealists or neo-Hegelians. The British neo-Idealist group included Bradley, Bosanquet,
Joseph, and Joachim, but a particularly signiﬁcant and often neglected ﬁgure here is the German Sigwart, who anticipated
by two decades Frege’s notion of presupposition (Voraussetzung) in discussing the problem of vacuous subjects.
For Strawson, as for his intellectual predecessor Frege [23], the notion of presupposition has semantic status as a nec-
essary condition on true or false assertion, but more recent work has taken the commitment to existential import in such
cases as constituting a pragmatic presupposition or an implicature (cf. e.g. Wilson [102]; Grice [32, Essay 17]). In fact, the
earliest pragmatic treatments of the failure of existential presupposition predate Frege’s analysis by two decades. Here is
Christoph Sigwart [90] on the problem of vacuous subjects:
As a rule, the judgement A is not B presupposes the existence of A in all cases when it would be presupposed in the
judgement A is B. . . ‘Socrates is not ill’ presupposes in the ﬁrst place the existence of Socrates, because only on the
presupposition [Voraussetuzung] of his existence can there be any question of his being ill.
(Sigwart [90]: 122, emphasis added)
Note in particular the contextual nature of the presupposition and the proto-Strawsonian ﬂavor of the conclusion. Fur-
ther, unlike either Frege or Strawson, Sigwart allows for wide-scope (presupposition-canceling) negation as a real, although
marked, possibility, although to be sure a negative singular statement is ‘commonly understood’ as implying the existence
of its subject referent.
If we answer the question ‘Is Socrates ill?’ by yes or no, then – according to our usual way of speaking – we accept
the presupposition [Voraussetzung] upon which alone the question is possible; and if we say of a dead man that he is
not ill, we are guilty of using our words ambiguously. It may still, however, be claimed that, by calling such an answer
ambiguous, we admit that the words do not, in themselves, exclude the other meaning; and that formally, therefore, the
truth of the proposition [Socrates is not ill] is incontestable [if Socrates is not alive].
(Sigwart [90]: 152, emphasis added)
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more broadly a semantic requirement) on negative statements, which can perfectly well be true (if possibly odd) when their
positive ground is lacking. Grice observes of a man lighting his cigarette in the ordinary way: “Now it is certainly the case
that it would be false to say of the man using a match, ‘He is now lighting his cigarette with a 20-dollar bill’, and so it is
true that he is not lighting his cigarette with a 20-dollar bill.” He adds: “So far as I know no philosopher since the demise
of the inﬂuence of Bradley has been in the least inclined to deny this” [32, p. 15]. (The mocking of Bradley seems to have
been a favorite sport with British mid-century philosophers. For example, Ayer [4, p. 39], quoting from Bradley [10, p. 115],
comments: “Any statement whatsoever which is seriously put forward may be picturesquely described as an attempt to
qualify reality; and if the statement turns out to be false the attempt may be said to have baﬄed”.)
Armed with this commentary by Grice, let us revisit Bradley’s contribution to the history of negation. Formally, Bradley
would have endorsed the unpacking of “∼ Px” as “(∃P ′)(P ′x & P | P ′)”. This is consistent with Grice’s earlier observation
that ‘not’ has the métier of ‘incompatible with’ (and not just ‘other than’). Bradley’s general view on negation focuses on
the idea of ‘positive ground’. This may again be seen as a development of the aforementioned medieval views on suppositio
and the notion of a “negative pregnant’. For Bradley [10, p. 200], any negative proposition presupposes a positive ground:
Every negation must have a ground, and this ground is positive. Nothing in the world can ever be denied except on the
strength of positive knowledge. We cannot deny without also aﬃrming. We should never trust a negative judgement
until we have seen its positive ground.
– a.k.a. its negatum. For denial to be possible, there must be, ﬁrst, the “suggestion” of an “aﬃrmative relation”:
If we suppose that, with reference to the tree the utterer has judged, ‘This tree is not yellow’, the judgment would have
to be construed as involving the aﬃrmative suggestion that the tree is yellow. In the negative judgment, the positive
relation of ‘yellow’ to the tree must precede the exclusion of that relation. What gets denied must be something that
already has a truth value.
The views of Bradley were inﬂuential enough in Oxford to merit a doggerel in The Oxford Book of Oxford [72]: “Thou positive
negation! negative aﬃrmation! thou great totality of every thing, that never is, but ever doth become, thee do we sing”.
We turn to the second great British neo-Idealist (of whom Grice’s assessment was somewhat unenthusiastic: “If we are
looking at the work of some relatively minor philosophical ﬁgure, such as for example Bosanquet. . .” – [30, p. 66]. Bosanquet
had his inﬂuence on Bradley himself; in his ‘Terminal Essay’ on negation, Bradley confesses “the chapter [on negation in
Principles of Logic] contains some serious errors. I have since accepted in the main Dr. Bosanquet’s account of negation”.
Bosanquet starts by citing Jevons, Mill, and Venn and arguing that “In negation, the work of aﬃrmative belief appears to be
performed by ignorance” [7, p. 277].
Of Sigwart’s view that every negation presupposes an aﬃrmation, so that ‘S is not P’ presupposes the aﬃrmation ‘S is P’,
Bosanquet declares: “I think it monstrous. I do not believe that you must ﬁnd an aﬃrmative standing before you can deny”
[7, p. 277]. Further, “A negation is not a denial of an aﬃrmative judgment, and therefore does not presuppose the aﬃrmation
of that which is denied”. Yet “a negation does presuppose some aﬃrmation” [7, p. 280]. Bosanquet reﬁnes Bradley’s position
by distinguishing the positive ground of a negative utterance (some contrary proposition, whose truth determines the truth
of the negative proposition) from the positive consequent (the indeterminate proposition which logically follows from the
negative). Thus, the positive ground of ‘This shirt is not red’ may be ‘This shirt is (e.g.) blue’, where blue is inconsistent
with red. The positive consequent, however, is simply “There exists a colour P′,P′ = red, such that this surface is P′” [7,
p. 287]. The relation between a negation and its aﬃrmative ground is one of contrariety, while a negation and its aﬃrmative
consequent are in contradictory opposition.
While Bradley leaned on Bosanquet, the direction of inﬂuence was in fact mutual. Bosanquet, citing Bradley’s notion
of ‘a suggested aﬃrmative relation’ endorses the latter’s view that ‘in the beginning, a negation is a degree more remote
from reality than is an aﬃrmation’. But while an aﬃrmation is epistemologically prior to negation, eventually, aﬃrmation
and negation alike become double-edged, each involving the other [7, p. 281]. For Bosanquet, only those negations which
presuppose an aﬃrmation can be signiﬁcant (let alone true). A signiﬁcant negative utterance “S is not P” can always be
analyzed as “S is P′ which excludes P”. “The surface is not red, but an undetermined colour”. An apparently insigniﬁcant or
bare negation (e.g. “The lion is not an elephant”, “Virtue is not a square”) does not posit a correct, true contrary, since it
does not limit the sphere of negation [7, p. 289].
Bosanquet advocates a similar line on negative utterances with vacuous descriptors. Of his example, ‘The house on the
marsh is not burnt down’, Bosanquet allows that the utterance is true when there is no house on the marsh, even if “reality
excludes the burning down of any such house”. Bosanquet confesses a ‘strong sympathy’ for the objection (straw or real)
that the utterance may be said to have ‘meaning only if there is a house, and the sentence presupposes [cf. Sigwart above]
or asserts that there is one”.
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Bosanquet’s insightful comment that “The essence of negation is to invest the contrary with the character of the contra-
dictory” [7, p. 291] epitomizes his unfortunately overlooked discovery of a class of cases that would now receive a plausible
Gricean account of contradictories in contrary clothing. (Cf. Horn [47, Chapter 5] and Horn [50] for elaborations of a variety
of such pragmatic strengthening processes.) One example is “Jones is not good”, which appears to represent contradictory
negation on “p” (“Jones is good”), and thus being representable as “∼p”. However, the ordinary copular negative yields a
relatively weak non-informative contradictory that tends to be strengthened, “so that from ‘Jones is not good’ one may be
able to infer something more than that ‘it is not true or the case that Jones is good’ ”.
As a related illustration of the same tendency to enrich a formal occurrence of a contradictory “∼p” to a contrary, given
his premise that “the essence of formal negation is to invest the contrary with the character of the contradictory”, Bosanquet
offers an early account of the phenomenon of negative transportation or neg-raising, i.e. “The habitual use of such a phrases
as ‘I do not believe it’, which refers grammatically to a fact of my intellectual state, but actually serves as a negation of
something ascribed to reality. Compare Gk. ον ημι [lit. ‘I don’t say’], which means ‘I deny’, or our common phrase, ‘I don’t
think that’ – which is really equivalent to ‘I think that – not”’ [7, p. 319]. Again this phenomenon can best be accounted by
an implicature-based account (see Horn [45], [47, Chapter 5]). Thus, instead of treating a negative judgment in Bradleyan
fashion as aiming at a ﬁnal aﬃrmative, Bosanquet sees canonical contradictory negation as functioning to express a notional
contrary, because when there are only two alternatives, the denial of one is equivalent to, and grounded on, the assertion
of the other.
The phenomenon of strengthened contrary readings for apparent contradictory negation has long been recognized, dat-
ing back to classical discussions of the ﬁgure of litotes, in which an aﬃrmative is indirectly asserted by negating its contrary
has been recognized since the 4th century rhetoricians Servius and Donatus as a ﬁgure in which we which we say less
and mean more (minus dicimus et plus signiﬁcamus, cited in Hoffmann [41, pp. 28–29]), thus representing one of the ﬁrst
explicitly pragmatic analyses in the Western tradition (cf. Horn [49] for elaboration). Note, however, that litotic interpreta-
tions tend to be asymmetrical: it is more likely that calling someone “not happy” or “not optimistic” will convey a contrary
(= rather unhappy/pessimistic) than that such virtual contrariety will be signaled by “not sad” or “not pessimistic”, which
tend to be understood as pure contradictories. Explanations for this asymmetry have been proposed by Ducrot [18] and
Horn [47, Chapter 5].
For a more formal approach to the strengthening of contradictory negation to virtual contrariety is due to the fourteenth
century logician Robert Bacon. Bacon begins the discussion in his Syncategoreumata by distinguishing three varieties of
interaction between negation and its focus: the ordinary negative name (nomen negatum) ‘isn’t just’ (non est iustus), the
inﬁnite name (nomen inﬁnitum) ‘is not-just’ (est non iustus), and the privative name with incorporated negation (nomen
privatum) ‘is unjust’ (est iniustus). Technically, he notes, the third of these unilaterally entails the second and the second the
ﬁrst, but ordinary usage is not always consistent with this:
Ex hiis patet quod bene sequitur argumentum a privato ad inﬁnitum, ut: ‘est iniustus; ergo est non iustus’. Similiter:
ab inﬁnito ad negatum, ut: ‘est non iustus; ergo non est iustus.’ Econverso autem non tenet, sed est paralogismus
consequentis. (Braakhuis [9, Vol. I, pp. 144–145]; Spruyt [94, p. 252])
From these it is apparent that the argument follows validly from the privative to the inﬁnite, thus “s/he is unjust,
therefore s/he is not-just”. Similarly, from the inﬁnite to the negative, thus “s/he is not-just, therefore s/he isn’t just”.
However, the converse does not hold, but is the fallacy of consequence.
For Bacon, the move from the contradictory X isn’t just to the contrary X is unjust is an instance of the fallacy of conse-
quence, the deductively invalid but inductively plausible strengthening of a suﬃcient condition to a necessary-and-suﬃcient
condition (see Horn [50] for an elaboration of this point within a pragmatic account of “conditional perfection”).
As for the “neg-raised” reading of “I don’t think that p” as “I think that not-p”, while often dismissed as an incidental
and deplorable ambiguity or (in Quine’s terms) an “idiosyncratic complication” of one language –
. . . the familiar quirk of English whereby ‘x does not believe that p’ is equated to ‘x believes that not p’ rather than to
‘it is not the case that x believes that p’
[83, pp. 145–146]
The phrase ‘a does not believe that p’ has a peculiarity . . . in that it is often used as if it were equivalent to ‘a believes
that -p’. [38, p. 15]
‘I do not believe that p’ can be unfortunately ambiguous between disbelief [Ba-p] and not belief [-Bap]. [17, p. 55]
– its roots and signiﬁcance for the study of negation go far deeper. The locus classicus for the phenomenon is St. Anselm’s
observation in the Lambeth fragments antedating Bosanquet by eight centuries; cf. Anselm [1] and the commentary in Henry
[40, pp. 193–194], Hopkins [42, pp. 231–232], and Horn [45, p. 200], [47, p. 308ff.]. Anselm points out that ‘non . . . omnis
qui facit quod non debet peccat, si proprie consideretur’ – not everyone who does what he non debet (‘not-should’) sins, if the
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problem is that we tend to use ‘non debere peccare’ to convey debere non peccare, rather than its literal contradictory meaning
(‘it is not a duty to sin’). A man who does what is not his duty does not necessarily sin thereby, but it is hard to stipulate
e.g. non debet ducere uxorem, the proposition that a man need not marry without seeming to commit oneself to the stronger
debet non ducere uxorem, an injunction to celibacy (Henry [40, p. 193ff.]; cf. C.J.F. Williams [101], Horn [46, p. 200]).
For Henry [40, p. 193, §6.412], Anselm’s observations on modal/negative interaction are “complicated by the quirks of
Latin usage. He has become conscious of the fact that, according to that usage, ‘non debet’, the logical sense of which is ‘It
isn’t that he ought’, is normally used not to mean exactly what it ways, but rather in the sense more correctly expressed by
‘debet non’ (‘he ought not’).” In fact, rather than constituting a quirk of English and/or Latin usage, “neg-raising” – the lower-
clause understanding of negation of a believe- or ought-type predicate – is distributed widely, although systematically, across
languages and operators. The raised understanding is always stronger than the contradictory (outer) negation; it applies to
a proper subset of the situations to which the contradictory applies (is true in a proper subset of possible worlds). Thus
neg-raising, as Anselm recognized, always yields a virtual contrariety: the compositional meaning is true but too weak, and
the addressee recovers a (short-circuited) conversational implicature to ‘ﬁll in’ the stronger proposition.
In any event, Bosanquet seems to have been the ﬁrst philosopher to see the general pattern represented by such ten-
dencies in ordinary language, although other instances of his principle (e.g. the generalization that aﬃxal negation in words
like unhappy or unjust tend to develop contrary semantics cross-linguistically) could be cited. One way of putting the point
is that contrariety tends to be maximized in natural language, while subcontrariety tends to be minimized.
15. Asymmetry revisited: the rise and fall of the neo-Idealists
Returning to the broader question of ‘positive negation’, we may count H.H. Joachim among its Idealist proponents.
For Joachim, another holder of the Wykeham logic professorship, a negative utterance expresses some “knowledge in the
making only” [60, p. 136]. Thus, an utterance like “The diagonal of the square is not commensurable with its side” is not
really negative, but has a positive, real import, namely, “to constitute a problem for a certain level of geometrical knowledge.
We have here a real disunion of elements in the real whole. The judicial separation expresses a real divorce”. [60, p. 128] The
Idealist account was the fare of the Oxford of the period, as in the logic manual by W.H. Joseph, of whom Grice observes
that he “was dedicated to the Socratic art of midwifery; he thought to bring forth error and to strangle it at birth” [30,
p. 62]. If “Dead nettles do not sting”, they nevertheless should possess some positive quality or other. If no sentient being
existed the utterance ‘The wall is not blue’ could not be true, since it can be uttered only because someone may suppose
or believe the wall to be blue. We must accept the negative judgment as expressing the real limitation of things; but we
must allow that it presupposes the aﬃrmative. If dead-nettles do not sting, there must be some characteristic which they
do possess, incompatible with stinging. There is always a positive character as the ground of negation. Snow is not hot
because it is cold . . . To know what anything is not is frequently a help to discovering what it is.” [61, p. 172] But on this
view, negation is subjective: if no sentient being existed the utterance ‘The wall is not blue’ could not be true, since it can
be uttered only because someone may suppose or believe the wall to be blue. Note also that the square root of 4 would not
be 3 even if no human ever existed to express this or any other negative proposition; see Horn [47, §1.2.2] on arguments
for and against the putatively subjective nature of negation.
By the time Grice was writing, neo-Idealism had long since been effectively dispelled by Cook Wilson and others. Wilson
[102] sketches a theory of negation that leaves room for presupposition, implicature, and their contextual cancellation. Most
of his examples are implicature- or presupposition-carrying examples of negative utterances. “It is not an odd number”,
someone says, the implication being “It is an even number”. Of course this is again cancellable, “In fact, it {is not a number
at all/does not exist}”. In the realm of non-binary and empirical propositions, the cancellability is more evident and the
range of ‘implications’ fuzzier. With “This man is not a Mohammedan”, Wilson [102, p. 250], “I cannot thereby determine his
religion, nor even that he has any at all”. (Due to the use of the demonstrative ‘this’ an actual cancellation will be awkward
here: “In fact this man does not exist”.) Wilson goes on to distinguish between the presupposition and the asserted content.
When it comes to the latter, he adopts a neo-Platonic doctrine, foreshadowing Grice’s later doctrine.
Wilson writes: “Although it is true that ordinary negative statements (e.g. “Nobody in the next room can read Greek”)
normally presuppose the existence of their subjects of attribution, this existence is not asserted by the negative statement as
such” [102, p. 259], and it is thus cancellable as an implicature (“. . .since the next room is empty”). “When is the verbal
form of negative statement natural and normal? When do we naturally say ‘A is not B’? Clearly when our conception of
Aness does not necessarily involve for us the distinction from Bness, or the absence of Bness” [102, p. 272]. He distinguishes
two scenarios. “The statement may correspond either to the apprehension of something in A which excludes Bness, or to
the mere observation of the fact that Bness is absent from A”. This ﬁrst case is of the form “A is C”, where Cness excludes
Bness. His example implicitly draws on the epistemological weakness that the felicitous use of negation typically suggests.
“This substance does not show blue colour in the ﬂame of the blowpipe” implies “This substance shows a colour other than
blue in the ﬂame of the blowpipe”. We arrive at this by observing that the colour shown in the ﬂame is, say, red. “Why then
have the negative statement at all, and not the aﬃrmative which tells us more and is fully adequate to the thought behind
the expression? The negative is not adequate, for if I say “The colour is not blue”, I do not say what colour it is and I omit
besides something which I know, which also is the reason for what I say”. (This argument works if I know that the ﬂame is
red, but not if I merely have suﬃcient information to rule out blueness.)
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attribute compatible with Aness” His example is “Private Atkins is not in the ranks” (implicating that a private other than
Atkins is in the ranks). “To ﬁnd out whether Atkins is in the ranks, we have to observe each rank and ﬁle and see that he
is not Atkins”.
Against the then ﬂourishing neo-Hegelian, Idealist dogma, Wilson [102, p. 273] is eager to stress the Realist side to his
account. In both scenarios, “the apprehension of the negation and of absence is after all the apprehension of two positive
realities as different from one another”.
The critique of neo-Idealism was redoubled with Ryle’s appearance on the Oxford scene. What Ryle brings to the picture
is a closer examination of colloquial cases. While Grice emphasizes that both Formalists and Informalists have failed to give
adequate attention “to the nature and importance of the conditions governing conversation”, he was presumably exempting
Ryle, whose efforts he credited for spearheading “the rapid growth of Oxford as a world centre of philosophy” [30, p. 48].
With respect to negation, the aim of Ryle, as for Grice and Strawson, is to identify some of the “conversational features”
of “not”. Ryle’s example is a familiar one: “Mrs. Smith’s hat is not green”, allowing the inference that “Mrs. Smith’s hat
is other than green”, understood broadly enough to include those scenarios where Mrs. Smith’s hat doesn’t exist – and
therefore it is other than green. But is the hat’s other-than-greenness part of the content of the negative statement? Ryle
writes:
When I say ‘Mrs. Smith’s hat is not green’, I can equivalently say ‘but some other colour’. The ‘but some other’ is always
there, sometimes explicitly, sometimes marked by tone of voice, or simply implied by the context. Without the but
clause, negative sentences are elliptical, though still generally interpretable in context. When I say, ‘Mrs. Smith’s hat is
not green but some other colour’, I am not stating but presupposing that the hat is coloured. In general, for any ‘The S
is not P’, what gets presupposed is that P belongs to a contextually assumed set, some other member P′ of which holds
of S. The full explication of what is meant by a negative sentence takes the form of an assertion of otherness as speciﬁed
or made determinate by mention of the particular disjunctive set to which the other belong to as members. (Ryle [87,
p. 89])
Such presuppositions are regarded by Ryle, as they would be for Strawson and as they were for Frege, as pre-conditions
for the truth or the falsity of a judgment, rather than merely as conditions on felicitous assertion. This presuppositional
approach would deny that “Mrs. Smith’s hat is not green” could be (trivially) true in the absence of Mrs. Smith’s hat,
whatever the implicature may be on that occasion. For transcategorial examples, the case is different; “Virtue is not square”
is still true, even if the continuation, ‘but some other shape’ confuses rather than illuminates.
16. Negation, presupposition, and the bracketing device
In the spirit of Modernism, Grice proposes – as we have seen in the formation, inference, and semantic rules of system
G – some type of ‘formal’ indication of the systematic interaction of negation with other elements of the logic. Grice played
with two ‘scope’ devices, and we shall consider them in turn, as they illustrate a pattern in the history of logic. The ﬁrst
is a subscript notation for scopal ambiguity. Quine, for one, found the system “forbiddingly complex” yet, he remarks, “on
the whole I am for it” [84, p. 326]. The idea is that any constituent in a formula gets a subscript to mark its order of
arrival. Thus, for the negation of a basic formula “∼p”, the device delivers two readings: “∼2 p1” and “∼1 p2”. Consider
one of Grice’s early examples, “Jones has not left off beating his wife”. The default ‘logical’ reading is the second. Hence
the possibility of the cancellation, “He is not married”. The default ‘pragmatic’ reading is the former, hence the paradoxical
ﬂavor.
Or consider, “The king of France is not bald”. On one reading, the logical one, “∼” has maximal scope:
“∼3 ((∃x)K1x & (∀y)(K y → x = y) & (B2x))”. On the pragmatic reading, negation is internal: “∼1 ((∃x)K2x & (∀y)(K y →
x = y) & (B3x))”, and gets the cancellation, ‘There is no such king” (∼1 ((∃x)K2x & (∀y)(K y → x = y) & (B3x)) | (∃x)K2x).
In a notational variant mentioned by Grice, taking up a suggestion by Hans Sluga, the two readings are: ∼2 B1ιx3K1x2 and
∼4 B1ιx3K1x2. (Grice mentions a notational variant suggested by Charles Parsons: “[Kx](∼Bx)” “∼ [Kx](Bx)”.)
Grice refers to the two readings as the weak reading and the strong reading. The diagnostic is the role played by negation.
If there were a clear distinction in sense (in English) between, say, ‘The king of France is not bald’ and ‘It is not the
case that the king of France is bald’ (if the former demanded the strong reading and the latter the weak one), then it
would be possible to correlate ‘The king of France is bald’ with the formal structure that treats the iota-operator like a
quantiﬁer. But this does not seem to be the case; I see no such clear semantic distinction. So it seems better to associate
‘The king of France is bald’ with the formal structure that treats the iota-operator as a term-forming device. (Grice [32,
p. 272])
The second device is a bracketing device, yielding the representation: “∼ [(∃x)Kx & (∀y)(K y → x = y)] & Bx”. Since
the square-bracketed material is (normally) scopally immune to negation, this will as a default get rewritten as
“(∃x)Kx & (∀y)(K y → x = y) & ∼ Bx”, with the externalization of the “presupposed” material.
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ground’ status, or noncontroversiality. The square-bracketed material is only implicated, and thus cannot occur freely in
monotonic inferences, since implicatures are cancellable (cf. Wilson [103] for a different implementation of a pragmatic
account of existential “presuppositions” as conversational implicatures).
Consider “Jones does not regret Father is ill” [32, pp. 280–281]. A preferred pragmatic inference is again the implicature-
carrying one (“Father is ill and Jones thinks Father is ill and Jones is not against Father being ill”), which is cancellable
(“Jones does not regret Father is ill. Indeed Father is not ill”). What the square-bracket device does is raise the subordinate
clause of ‘regret’ outside the scope of “∼”: “[Father is ill &] Jones thinks Father is ill & ∼(Jones is ANTI (Father is ill)”). (See
Horn [51, pp. 74–76] for a new look at Grice’s bracketing device.)
Another area for implicatural treatment concerns the scope of negation outside the radical (“∼ √p” rather than “√∼p”).
In discussing a ‘general notion of satisfactoriness’ [34, p. 83], while generalized versions for the binary truth-functors are
unproblematic – ‘φ & ψ ’ is satisfactory just in case φ is satisfactory and ψ is satisfactory, and so on, the unary truth-functor
is not so easily dealt with: “The real crunch comes with negation. ‘∼ 	 p’ might perhaps [contra Frege [21]] be treated as
equivalent to ‘	 ∼p’. But what about ‘∼!p’?” – i.e. negation outside the scope of a directive speech act.
In particular, Grice asks,
“What do we say in cases like, perhaps, ‘Let it be that I now put my hand on my head’ or ‘Let it be that my bicycle faces
north’, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that neither ‘!A’ nor ‘!∼A’ is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
What value do we assign to ‘∼!A’ and to ‘∼!A’? Do we proscribe the forms altogether (for all cases)? But that would
seem to be a pity, since ‘∼!∼A’ seems to be quite promising as a representation of ‘you may (permissive) do A’: that is,
I signify my refusal to prohibit your doing A. Do we disallow embedding of these forms? But that (again if we use them
to represent ‘may’) seems too restrictive”.
The problem “would require careful consideration; but I cannot see that it would prove insoluble, any more than analogous
problems connected with presupposition are insoluble; in the latter case the diﬃculty is not so much to ﬁnd a solution as
to select the best solution from those which present themselves”. [34, p. 89]
17. Implicature and negation: scales, scopes, and metalinguistic negation
Grice characterizes the complications often introduced by negation in terms of a loss of (logical) innocence. “[I]f rational
beings are equipped to assert a certain range of statements, they must also be supposed to be equipped to deny just that
range of statements. In that case, the negations of the initial range of logically innocent statements may be supposed to
lie within the compass of the speakers of the language; and these statements by virtue of their character as denials, may
not wear the same guise of logical innocence”. [32, p. 70] One illustration involves the interaction of negation with focus or
contrast. Grice considers various conversational scenarios here, including one in which an utterer B says (apparently out of
the blue), “JONES didn’t pay the bill”. Grice comments [32, p. 52]:
The remark is not prompted by a previous remark (it is volunteered), and we are inclined to say that the implicature is
that someone thinks or might think that Jones did pay the bill. The maxim of Relation requires that B’s remark should
be relevant to something or other, and B, by speaking as if he would speak in reply to a statement that Jones paid the
bill, shows that he has such a statement in mind.
A similar point had been made earlier by Ryle, concerning the example “Jones is not the secretary of the club”, where
stressing each constituent projects what, in Gricean terms, is a different implicature: “Jones is not the secretary of the club”
(someone other than Jones is), “Jones is not the secretary of the club” (he holds an oﬃce other than secretary), “Jones is not
the secretary of the club (he is the secretary of an institution other than the club), “Jones is not the secretary of the club
(but he served in the role at some other time)” [87, p. 89].
Another much discussed set of examples involves an interchange related to a different exchange Grice presents in this
section:
I KNEW that may be contrasted with I believed that, and the speaker may implicate not that he would deny I believed that
p, but that he would not conﬁne himself to such a weaker statement, with the implicit completion I did not merely believe
it. (Grice [32, p. 52], cf. Proclus, Parmenides 913 on hyperapophasis.)
In such cases, a logically weaker or less informative utterance implicates that the speaker was not in position to have
uttered a stronger alternative, salva veritate.
The operative principle is Grice’s ﬁrst submaxim of quantity (or the earlier “rule of strength” attributed by Strawson [96]
to Grice; see discussion above). In fact, this rule and its epistemological constraints on its operation date back at least to
Mill [70, p. 501]:
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because the words meant it, but because, if I had seen them all, it is most likely that I should have said so: even though
this cannot be presumed unless it is presupposed that I must have known whether the children I saw were all or not”.
But as Mill goes on to observe, this cannot be a part of the content or, as we would now call it, the logical form of expres-
sions with “some”, contra Sir William Hamilton’s arguments for doing just that: “No shadow of justiﬁcation is shown. . .for
thus adopting into logic a mere sous-entendu of common conversation in its most unprecise form”. Similarly, while disjunc-
tions are naturally taken exclusively – “When we say A is either B or C we imply that it cannot be both” – this too cannot
be a logical inference: “If we assert that a man who has acted in a particular way must be either a knave or a fool, we by
no means assert, or intend to assert, that he cannot be both” [70, p. 512]. (See Horn [43,47,48] and Speranza [91] for more
on Mill and similar arguments from De Morgan.)
This scalar or Q-implicature induced here by the quantitative scale 〈all, some〉 arises in a wide range of cases involving
both logical operators and ordinary predicates (see Levinson [65] for a comprehensive catalog). The one alluded to by
Grice above involves the scale 〈know,believe〉, with the result that an assertion of belief generally (but non-monotonically)
conveys absence of knowledge. In general, for a scale 〈Pn, Pn−1, . . . , P2, P1〉 and a constituent Pi , the Q-implicature is
∼ S(Pi/P j) for all P j > Pi ( j = n), where “ϕ(Pi/P j)” denotes the result of substituting P j for Pi within ϕ , ∼ S(P i/Pn), and
if Pk > P j > Pi , ∼ S(Pi/P j), ∼ S(Pi/Pk). (See Gazdar [24, pp. 55–62] for a comprehensive formulation.)
But now we are prepared to see that a speaker may choose to convey “I didn’t merely believe that p” not by asserting
“I KNEW that” (as in Grice’s example of contrastive stress) by apparently denying that she believes that p, especially with the
appropriate continuation or rectiﬁcation: “I didn’t believe that p, I KNEW it”. This does not require rejecting the inference
from knowledge to belief, if we acknowledge a specialized metalinguistic or polemic use of negation in such contexts, and
at the same time such an account permits us to retain the “logical innocence” of ordinary negation. Note that while ‘He
believed it’ is true if he also knew it, ‘He merely believed it’ is false in the same scenario. Essentially, this specialized use of
negation targets not the propositional content (what is said) but the (potential) implicature.
The tacit principle which Mill invokes and which Grice later formulates as the Quantity submaxim, requiring the speaker
to use the stronger all in place of the weaker some when possible and licensing the hearer to draw the corresponding infer-
ence when the stronger term is not used, is systematically exploitable to yield upper-bounding generalized conversational
implicatures associated with scalar operators. Quantity-based scalar implicature – e.g. my inviting you to infer from my use
of some. . . that for all I know not all. . . – is driven by our presumed mutual knowledge that I expressed a weaker proposition
in lieu of an equally unmarked utterance that would have expressed a stronger proposition. Thus, what is said in the use of
a weaker scalar value like those in I saw some of your children or I believed that p is the lower bound (. . .at least n . . .), with
the upper bound (. . .at most n . . .) implicated as a cancellable implicature. The prima facie alternative view, on which a given
scalar predication is lexically ambiguous between weaker and stronger readings, is ruled out by the general metatheoretical
consideration that Grice dubs the Modiﬁed Occam’s Razor principle: “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” [32,
p. 47].
Negating such predications normally denies the lower bound: to say that something is not possible is to say that it’s
impossible, i.e. less than possible. When it is the upper bound that appears to be negated (It’s not possible, it’s NECESSARY), a
range of linguistic and logical evidence indicates that what we are dealing here with is an instance of the metalinguistic (or
echoic) use of negation, in which the negative particle is used to object to any aspect of an alternate (actual or envisaged)
utterance, including its conventional and conversational implicata, register, morphosyntactic form or pronunciation (Horn
[47, Chapter 6]; Carston [12]). If it’s hot, it’s (a fortiori) warm, but if I know it’s hot, the assertion that it’s warm can be
mentioned and rejected as (not false but) insuﬃciently informative: “It’s not WARM, it’s HOT!”, “You didn’t see SOME of my
children, you saw ALL of them”, “I didn’t BELIEVE that p, I KNEW it”.
Such uses of negation effectively scope over other varieties of implicature. Thus, in “It is not the case that she got
married and had a child” (after Grice [32, p. 8]), the utterer may be denying the implicature (generated by the “Be orderly”
submaxim) that the events referred to occurred in the order in which they mentioned, conveying something like “Rather,
she had a child and [then] got married”. If this can be analyzed away as metalinguistic negation, there is no need to depart
from the syntax and semantics of System G (“∼(p & q)”).
Or with disjunction: “It is not the case that my wife is in Oxford or in London – she’s in Oxford, as you well know”.
This too can be understood metalinguistically, with the negation scoping over the implicature responsible for the non-truth-
functional condition on the felicity (but not the truth!) of p or q statements that the speaker should not be in a position to
assert either disjunct individually. The logical form is again, however, the classical one: “∼(p ∨ q)”.
Grice considers a related phenomenon what he calls ”substitutive disagreement”, as opposed to truth-functional “con-
tradictory disagreement” [32, p. 64]. Once again, we have a negation that does translate into “∼p”. In such cases, “I am
not contradicting what you say. It is rather that I wish not to assert what you have asserted, but to substitute a different
statement which I regard as preferable in the circumstances” [32, p. 64]. This situation arises with both disjunctions and
conditionals. Thus,
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Y will be elected” not as false but as unassertable. (Grice [32, p. 82])
I do not thereby deny the proposition you have expressed (which would amount to a commitment to the electoral failure of
both X and Y), but reject your assertion as epistemologically unwarranted (in ruling out candidate Z). Grice emphasizes that
“the possibility of speaking in this way gives no ground for supposing that “or” is not truth-functional”; it does, however,
introduce a subtler question on the truth-functionality of “not”.
Similarly, to negate a conditional is typically not to assert ‘∼(p → q)’: “to say ‘It is not the case that if Jones is given
penicillin, he will get better’ might be a way of suggesting that the drug might have no effect on X at all” rather than
committing the speaker to the truth of “Jones will be given penicillin” and the falsity of “Jones will get better”.
Sometimes the denial of a conditional has the effect of a refusal to assert the conditional in question, characteristically
because the denier does not think that there are adequate non-truth-functional grounds for such an expression. In such
a case, he denies, in effect, what the thesis represents as an implicature of the utterance of the unnegated conditional.
(Grice [32, p. 81])
As Grice notes in his ‘Retrospective Epilogue’, this approach requires an acknowledgement of the possibility that conversa-
tional implicatures need not take wide scope, in particular with respect to negation, a possibility Grice endorses with some
diﬃdence:
When a sentence which used in isolation standardly carries a certain implicature is embedded in a certain linguistic
context, for example appears within the scope of a negation-sign, must the negation sign be interpreted only as working
on the conventional import of the embedded sentence, or may it on occasion be interpreted as governing not the
conventional import but the non-conventional implicatum of the embedded sentence? Only if an embedding operator
may on occasion be taken as governing not the conventional import but the non-conventional implicatum standardly
carried by the embedded sentence can the ﬁrst version of my account of such linguistic phenomena as conditionals and
deﬁnite descriptions be made to work. The denial of a conditional needs to be treated as denying not the conventional
import but the standard implicatum attaching to an isolated use of the embedded sentence. (Grice [32, p. 375])
Neo-Traditionalists such as Strawson have remained unconvinced by the argument, refusing to concede that the issue
of the divergence between “∼” and “not” was now settled, especially with regard to negated conditionals: “The Gricean,
though perhaps with a slight air of desperation, could reply that one who denies the condition has no interest in denying
what it conventionally and literally means, but only in denying what it standardly and conversationally implies” [97, p. 15].
Nor is it clear that treating the negatum as a conventional implicatum rather than a conversational one would minimize the
air of desperation in the eyes of a Strawson.
Another case that allows for reanalysis involving implicature, as we have noted, concerns the aforementioned case of the
disappearing presupposition.
As far as I can see, in the original version of Strawson’s truth-gap theory, he did not recognized any particular asymmetry,
as regards the presupposition that there is a king of France, between the two sentences, The king of France is bald and The
king of France is not bald; but it does seem plausible to suppose that there is such an symmetry. I would have thought
that the implication that there is a king of France is clearly part of the conventional force of The king of France is bald;
but that his is not clearly so in the case of The king of France is not bald. . .An implication that there is a king of France is
often carried by [], but it tempting to suggest that this is implication is a matter of conversational implicature.
(Grice [32, p. 270])
One key here is the application of the tests for implicature: cancellability (The king of France isn’t bald – (because) there is
no king of France) and non-detachability. To demonstrate the latter, Grice notes that whether we use the frame “It is not the
case that the King of France is bald”, “It is false that the king of France is bald”, or “It is not true that the king of France is
bald”, “Many of what seem to be other ways of saying, approximately, what is asserted by [“The king of France is not bald”]
also carry the existential implicature” (Grice [32, p. 271]). Such tests can be taken to support those proposals, including
those employing Grice’s bracketing device, concur in distinguishing the positive expression (in which existence is entailed)
from the negative (in which it is non-monotonically implicated).
18. Implicature and negation: Subcontrariety and the three-cornered square
Scalar implicature plays another role in the expression of negation in natural language. A Gricean understanding of the
relationship between strong and weak scalar values helps motivate a natural account of the lexicalization asymmetry of the
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[47, §4.5]; Levinson [65]; Horn [53,54]).
DETERMINERS/QUANTIFIERS QUANT. ADVERBS BINARY QUANTIFIERS CORRELATIVE CONJUNCTIONS BINARY CONNECTIVES
A: all α, everyone always both (of them) both. . .and and
I: some α, someone sometimes one (of them) either. . .or or
E: no α, no one never neither (of them) neither. . .nor nor
(= all ¬/¬ some) (= always ¬) (= both ¬/¬ either) (= [both . . . and]¬) (= and ¬)
O: *nall α, *neveryone *nalways *noth (of them) *noth. . .nand *nand
(= some ¬/¬ all) (= ¬ always) (= either ¬/¬ both) (= [either . . .or]¬) (= and ¬/¬ or)
In fact, this asymmetry was recognized for Latin by St. Thomas, who observed that whereas in the case of the universal
negative (A) “the word ‘no’ [nullus] has been devised to signify that the predicate is removed from the universal subject
according to the whole of what is contained under it”, when it comes to the particular negative (O), we ﬁnd that
there is no designated word, but ‘not all’ [non omnis] can be used. Just as ‘no’ removes universally, for it signiﬁes the
same thing as if we were to say ‘not any’ [i.e. ‘not some’], so also ‘not all’ removes particularly inasmuch as it excludes
universal aﬃrmation.
(Aquinas, in Arist. de Int., Lesson X, Oesterle, 1962, pp. 82–83)
The Gricean model offers a persuasive motivation for this asymmetry. Although some does not contribute the same
semantic content as some not (= not all), the use of either of the two values typically results in a speaker communicating
the same information in a given context, viz. ‘some but not all’. The relation of mutual quantity implicature holding between
the positive and negative subcontraries results in the superﬂuity of one of the two for lexical realization and the functional
markedness of negation predicts that the unlexicalized subcontrary will always be the one with an O rather than I meaning.
The existence of a lexicalized O form implies the existence of a lexicalized E counterpart but not vice versa. Additional
evidence (see above sources) indicates that even when both forms are attested, as with the negative modalities can’t,
mustn’t, shouldn’t (E) vs. needn’t (O), the lexicalized E form tends to be more opaque and semantically and distributionally
less constrained than its O counterpart. This pragmatic, implicature-based account of the ‘three-cornered square’ is more
general and more explanatory than rival theories that either dismiss the asymmetry as uninteresting or restrict it to the
determiners and quantiﬁcational operators while bypassing other operator types (e.g. connectives, adverbs, and modalities)
along with intermediate values that can be mapped onto the Square of Opposition. (See Horn [47] and Horn [54] for details
and Jaspers [57] and Seuren [89] for alternative treatments and related discussion.)
19. Negation and denial
A topic that concerned mathematicians such as Griss [35] is whether weak negation can be made sense of. He thought
not, whence his ‘negationless system’. System G is not like that. But the issue of how denial and negation interact is a
further problem that must be handled via implicature.
For Grice, one key step occurs when the logical squiggle is internalized into a psychological attitude operator. Grice sets
the question in dealing with how negation interacts with the scope of various psychological attitudes in his presidential
address to the American Philosophical Association, ‘Method in Philosophical Psychology’, where Grice explores what an
account of negation in terms of the psychological attitude of denial might look like. This has a connection with topics that
concerned Austin and speciﬁcally with the pattern of inferences in psychological contexts (e.g. If one believes that not-not-
p, does one believe that p?). Undertaking the exploration of “not” and ‘∼’ in connection with propositional attitudes is an
attempt to examine negation in models of belief- and knowledge-based reasoning. Grice views this as a metaphysical issue.
“References to such psychological states will be open to logical operations such as negation” [33, p. 146].
The internalization of the logical operation of negation within the scope of a psychological attitude operator may be seen
as involving various stages. Grice distinguishes four:
At the ﬁrst stage we have some initial concept, like that expressed by ‘not’. We can think of it as, at this stage, an
intuitive or unclariﬁed element of our conceptual vocabulary. At the second stage, we reach a speciﬁc mental state,
in the speciﬁcation of which it is possible, though maybe not necessary to use the name of the initial concept as an
adverbial modiﬁer, ‘not-thinking’ (or ‘rejecting’, or ‘denying’). This speciﬁc state may be thought of as bound up with,
and indeed as generating, some set of responses to the appearance on the scene of an instantiation of the initial concept.
At the third stage, a reference to this speciﬁc state is replaced by a more general psychological verb, together with an
operator corresponding to the particular speciﬁc stage which appears within the scope of a general verb [‘accept’], but is
still allowed only maximal scope within the complement of the verb, and cannot appear in sub-clauses [‘thinking not-p’,
‘accepting not-p’]. At the fourth stage, the restriction imposed by the demand that the operator at stage three should be
scope-dominant within the complement of the accompanying verb is removed [. . .]. [30, p. 98]
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negation, he is positively concerned elsewhere with the ontology and logic of non-events (cf. Gale [22], Horn [47, pp. 54–
55]):
In many cases, what are to be counted as actions are realized, not in events or happenings, but in non-events or non-
happenings. What I do is often a matter of what I do not prevent, what I allow to happen, what I refrain from or abstain
from bringing about – what, when it comes about, I ignore or disregard. I do not interrupt my children’s chatter; I ignore
the conversational intrusions of my neighbour; I omit the ﬁrst paragraph of the letter I read aloud; I hold my ﬁre when
the rabbit emerges from the burrow, and so on. . . Such omissions and forbearances might lead to the admission of
negative events, or negative happenstances, with one entity ﬁlling the ‘event slot’ if on a particular occasion I go to
Hawaii, or wear a hat, and another entity ﬁlling that slot if on that occasion I do not go to Hawaii, or do not wear a hat.
(Grice [30, p. 22])
It seems it would be again the conversational context that would advise us as to whether and how to apply the “∼” in a
given formalization.
One simple set of implicatures concern duplex negatio aﬃrmat. Following Bishop Lowth, Edward Bentham recites the
standard principle: “According to the idiom of some languages (Latin and English), two negative particles destroy each
others force, and make the proposition aﬃrmative” (cf. Horn [49] for additional references and elaboration). But if, as Jevons
avers, “Negatives signify the absence of a quality” [59, p. 22], a double negative would signify a double absence, which does
not obviously yield a presence. The point had been noted by Strawson: “This identiﬁcation [of not and “∼”], then, involves
only those minimum departures from the logic of ordinary language which must always result from the formal logician’s
activity of codifying rules with the help of verbal patterns: viz., the adoption of a rigid rule when ordinary language permits
variations and deviations from the standard use (“∼ ∼p ⊃ p”, “p ∨ ∼p”)”.
The issue was again raised by L.J. Cohen [14], who argues from the existence of negative concord (in languages like Ital-
ian, present-day non-standard dialects of English, or earlier standard English, in which e.g. “I don’t want nothing” expresses
the same proposition as that expressed in standard English by “I don’t want anything”) to the incoherence of Grice’s identi-
ﬁcation of “∼” with “not”. In such cases Duplex negatio negat, although here again, the question arises for the grammarian (if
not the logician) as to why a speaker would go out of her way to employ double negation rather than expressing a simple
negative (or, in the Duplex negatio aﬃrmat cases, a simple aﬃrmative) directly; cf. Horn [54]. In any case, Cohen’s objec-
tion seems ill-taken; the natural Gricean rebuttal is to treat negation as being an abstract syntactic constituent or element
of semantic representation, rather than to limit the focus to the superﬁcial occurrence of equivalents of “not” in ordinary
language (cf. Gazdar [24, pp. 63–64]).
Implicature also plays a role in motivating the choice of the standard “∼” operator, yielding a truth array of 〈0 1〉, over
the three other possible unary truth-functors, those yielding arrays of 〈1 0〉, 〈1 1〉, and 〈0 0〉. The choice is based on the
fact that “∼” is the only one-place operator that, in collaboration with the Co-Operative Principle and its maxims, yields an
intuitively plausible system. The other unary functors can be shown to be either redundant or semantically incoherent [24,
p. 76]. System G narrows propositional negation to the contradiction function, while deriving the strengthened reading of
contrariety, where appropriate, as an implicature (along the lines of Horn [47, Chapter 5]).
20. Negation and falsity
One favorite issue for the Oxford Play-Group was the extent to which negation could be identiﬁed with falsity. While
Grice himself often took “It is false that p” and “It is not the case that p” to count as moves in the same game [32, p. 271],
the situation in reality is somewhat more complex.
For centuries, one popular method for eliminating negation has proceeded by identifying it with and “reducing” it to
falsity. One question is whether such a “reduction”, if it could be accomplished, would really accomplish anything. But there
are in any case strong grounds for rejecting the proposed identiﬁcation in the ﬁrst place, without even considering its role
within a reductionist program.
That negation and falsity might be conﬂated, and eventually confused, with each other should not be surprising. Aristotle
discusses ‘being in the sense of true and non-being in the sense of false’ (Met. 1027b18), and he seems to explicitly link the
negated copula with falsity (as the aﬃrmative copula is linked with truth):
“To be” and “is” mean that something is true, and “not to be” that it is not true but false . . . For example, in “Socrates
is musical”, the “is” means that it is true that Socrates is musical, and in “Socrates is not-white”, that this is true; but in
“the diagonal is not commensurate with the side” the “is not” means that it is false that the diagonal is commensurate
with the side.
Within Aristotle’s simple correspondence theory of truth, truth and falsity are interrelated as the two terms of a con-
tradictory opposition. But contradictory negation does not reduce to falsity, since negation and falsity are about different
things and operate on different levels: “A falsity is a statement of that which is that it is not, or of that which is not that it
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18b2-4).
The equation of negation (often speciﬁcally “logical” negation) and falsity is a frequent maneuver among the Idealists of
the late 19th and early 20th century, often going hand-in-hand with a view of negation as a second-order comment on a
ﬁrst-order aﬃrmation, and/or as a more subjective act than simple aﬃrmation:
To say “A is not B” is merely the same as to deny that “A is B”, or to assert that “A is B” is false. (Bradley [10, p. 118])
“A is not B” means “it is false, it must not be believed that A is B”. . . Immediately and directly, the negation is a judgment
concerning a positive judgment that has been essayed or passed. (Sigwart [90, p. 122])
a is not b = that a is b is false. (Baldwin [5, p. 147])
The pure negative judgment ‘A is not B’ is equivalent in every case to ‘it is false that A is B’. . . ‘Snow is not black’ is a
shorthand statement for ‘snow is black is an erroneous judgment’. (Wood [104, p. 421])
For Russell [86, p. 81], too, every negation is a shorthand for some assertion of falsity: “It is unnecessary to have the two
words “false” and “not”, for, if p is a proposition, “p is false” and “not-p” are strictly synonymous”.
Within the modern logical (and linguistic) tradition, the temptation to identify negation and falsity stems directly from
the Fregean line that all negation is propositional and reducible to a suitably placed ‘it is not true that. . .’. In multi-valued
logics, there is one form of negation (internal, strong, choice) which does not display the logic of contradictory opposi-
tion, being governed by the Law of Non-Contradiction but not the Law of Excluded Middle (see Horn [52]). Within such
approaches, at least some negations cannot be “reduced to” assertions of falsity. Similarly, there may be illocutionary dis-
tinctions between the negation of a proposition and the statement that proposition is false, as in Heinemann’s differentiation
[37, p. 143] of not-p (‘p is valid’) from ‘p is not valid’. But even within classical two-valued logic itself, there are suﬃcient
grounds for rejecting the identiﬁcation of negation and falsity. Philosophers as diverse as Frege [21], Austin [2], Quine [82],
and Geach [25] have observed that the identiﬁcation of not and false results from a confusion of language and metalanguage.
Here is Austin’s response to the view (represented by Ayer) that ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ are logically superﬂuous:
An important point about this view is that it confuses falsity with negation: for according to it, it is the same thing to say
‘He is not at home’ as to say ‘It is false that he is at home’. . . Too many philosophers maintain, when anxious to explain
away negation, that a negation is just a second order aﬃrmation (to the effect that a certain ﬁrst order aﬃrmation is
false), yet, when anxious to explain away falsity, maintain that to assert that a statement is false is just to assert its
negation (contradictory). . . Aﬃrmation and negation are exactly on a level, in this sense, that no language can exist
which does not contain conventions for both and that both refer to the world equally directly, not to statements about
the world.
(Austin [2, pp. 128–129])
Quine [82, pp. 27–28]) is also at pains to distinguish the predicates ‘is false’ and ‘is true’, which are used to speak about
statements, from the connective “∼”, which is used to make statements. ‘Jones is ill’ is false is a statement about the statement
Jones is ill, while ∼(Jones is ill), read ‘Jones is not ill’, is a statement about Jones. Quine lays the mistaken identiﬁcation of
‘∼’ with falsehood at Whitehead and Russell’s door, but the underlying mistake both antedates and survives the Principia
– as does its rectiﬁcation. The Stoics were careful to make the same distinction as Quine, that ‘between the negation of a
proposition and a (metalinguistic) statement that the proposition is false’; these two operations played different roles in the
Stoics’ account of syllogistic reasoning [67, pp. 64–65].
In the same vein as Austin and Quine, Geach [25, p. 76] inveighs against the ‘widespread mistake’ of assuming that ‘the
negation of a statement is a statement that statement is false, and thus is a statement about the original statement and
logically secondary to it’. The error of this approach emerges clearly when we look at non-declaratives: “‘Do not open the
door!” is a command on the same level as “Open the door!” and does not mean (say) “Let the statement that you open the
door be false!”’
For symmetricalists like Austin, Geach, and Ayer, conclusions as to the secondary status of negative statements with
respect to aﬃrmatives often betoken a confusion of meaning with ‘use’. This is how Ayer – and Grice – diagnose Strawson’s
account of negation. In Ayer’s words,
From the fact that someone asserts that it is not raining one is not entitled to infer that he has ever supposed, or
that anyone has ever suggested, that it is, any more than from the fact that someone asserts that it is raining one is
entitled to infer that he has ever supposed, or that anyone has ever suggested, that it is not. No doubt negative forms of
expression are very frequently used to deny some previous suggestion; it may even be that this is their most common
use. But whatever the interest of this fact it cannot be the ground of any viable distinction between different types of
statement. (Ayer [4, p. 39])
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ments: “Why should it not be allowed that the statement that the Atlantic Ocean is not blue is as much a description of
the Atlantic as the statement that the Mediterranean Sea is blue is a description of the Mediterranean?” While the negative
might well be less informative than its aﬃrmative counterpart, “to say that a description is relatively uninformative is not
to say that it is not a description at all” (Ayer [4, p. 47]).
“Perhaps”, Ayer rhetorically wonders, “there are psychological grounds for sequestering negations as a special class of
statements used only for rebuttals or denials? But any statement can be so used” [4, p. 38]. Along the same lines, Grice
[32], while providing “The man at the next table is not lighting his cigarette with a $20 bill” as an instance of a negation that
sounds odd if the corresponding aﬃrmative has not been entertained, also brings up cases like “I went to the meeting of
my own free will”, “I remember my own name”, and “Your wife is faithful”, where it is the aﬃrmative that is inappropriate
in the absence of a specially marked context. When a positive sentence is less informative than the corresponding negation,
it is the positive that is odder or presuppositionally richer. (See Horn [47, §3.3.1] for a neo-Gricean derivation of this
asymmetry.) Thus, while Strawson may be correct in claiming that “the standard and primary use” of negatives is “to
correct and contradict”, this cannot be a deﬁnitional criterion of the property of negation; use is not meaning.
21. Envoi: A Gricean program for negation and implicature
While absent from otherwise complex systems of animal communication, negation is a sine qua non of every human
language. Indeed, if our species can be dubbed homo linguisticus, it is negation that makes us fully human, providing us with
the capacity to deny, to contradict, to misrepresent, to lie, and to convey irony. The apparent simplicity of logical negation
as a one-place operator that toggles truth and falsity belies the intricate complexity of the expression of negation in natural
language. For these reasons, the form and function of negation has engaged the interest and often the passion of scholars
for thousands of years. But it is arguably the contributions of Paul Grice that have enabled us to sort out the contributions
of general principles of communication and rational interchange to the speciﬁc habits of negating and denying that show
up in language.
Grice departs from his logician predecessors and from the ordinary language philosophers in the Oxford Play-Group
in subsuming his view of linguistic cooperation in the conversational enterprise within a general theory of rationality
(see Kasher [62]). But, as he also reminds us, “It is irrational to bite off more than you can chew whether the object of
your pursuit is hamburgers or the Truth” [32, p. 369]. Ever true to the spirit of the Quantity maxim, Grice was always
rational enough to bite off neither more nor less than his appetite permitted. But no man lives by meat alone, much
less a philosopher of language large enough to bestride the warring camps of Russell’s Modernists and Strawson’s Neo-
Traditionalists; bread is important as well. So it is meet that a healthy portion of the Gricean oeuvre consists not of solutions
but of problems, questions, and menus. For, as Grice reminds us elsewhere in offering a defense of absolute value admittedly
“bristling with unsolved or incompletely solved problems” [30, p. 106], “If philosophy generated no new problems it would
be dead. . . Those who still look to philosophy for their bread-and-butter should pray that the supply of new problems never
dries up”. As the history of work on negation eloquently demonstrates, there is no danger of that dread eventuality coming
to pass any time soon.
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